From: The IAB[SMTP:iab@ietf.org] Sent: Thursday, October 15, 1998 9:35 AM Subject: IAB statement on "private doorbell" encryption
The IAB and IESG are concerned by published descriptions of the "private doorbell" approach to resolving the encryption controversy. Essentially, the private doorbell requires that encryption and decryption be done at a gateway, rather than at an end system; see http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/779/govtaff/policy/paper/paper_index.html for one description. This is in conflict with the "end-to-end" principle, a fundamental tenet of the Internet architecture. While there is certainly a place for gateway-based encryption in some circumstances, to require it in all places (and to exclude end-to-end encryption) would warp the protocol structure. Furthermore, it offers a significantly lower level of security, in that there is no longer protection against inside attacks, which by all accounts are a serious threat.
In addition, putting all security at the gateway ignores the need for different levels of protection in different situations. For some applications, encryption to the gateway may suffice. Others may require encryption and cryptographic authentication of the individual machine or even user. Should a strong encryption algorithm be used, or a very efficient one? It is very difficult to make these decisions anywhere but the end-system. But the "private doorbell" scheme would block deployment of such fine-grained protection.
========================================================== Mark Leighton Fisher Thomson Consumer Electronics fisherm@indy.tce.com Indianapolis, IN "Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is 'Don't Tread on Me'"