-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Tue, 6 May 1997, Lee Tien wrote:
[I wonder: how does SAFE interact with IPSEC and arrangements like S/WAN? This is not, I think, merely the "willful furtherance" provision. The "law enforcement" access provision may be ambiguous for keys that are not "private"; my understanding of IPSEC is that the key is in the possession of the machine and not the user. I'm unclear whether users have 4th A. standing to challenge law enforcement access to such keys; there are lots of 4th A cases where a person has no privacy interest in information because it's been disclosed to another person, or is in another person's control. Of course, I probably don't understand how IPSEC works, so corrections are welcomed.]
SKIP, one key exchange protocol for IPSEC, allows for both user and IP-based keys. Since these keys would be probably be stored on the same machine, it raises some interesting 4th A issues. The keys could either be seen as under the control of the owner of the computer and can be disclosed at his discretion, or similar to email where the data is considered private and the owner of the hardware does not have the right to disclose this information. Regardless, one big win with IPSEC is its use of Diffie-Hellman key exchange which makes recovery of past session keys impossible (I believe the term for this is "forward secrecy"). A warrant won't do the feds much good.
Lee
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