Erwann ABALEA <erwann@abalea.com> writes:
I've read your objections. Maybe I wasn't clear. What's wrong in installing a cryptographic device by default on PC motherboards? I work for a PKI 'vendor', and for me, software private keys is a nonsense.
A simple crypto device controlled by the same software is only slightly less nonsensical. That is, the difference between software-controlled keys and a device controlling the keys that does anything the software tells it to is negligible. To get any real security you need to add a trusted display, I/O system, clock, and complete crypto message-processing capability (not just "generate a signature" like the current generation of smart cards do), and that's a long way removed from what TCPA gives you.
You could obviously say that Mr Smith won't be able to move his certificates from machine A to machine B, but more than 98% of the time, Mr Smith doesn't need to do that.
Yes he will. That is, he may not really need to do it, but he really, really wants to do it. Look at the almost-universal use of PKCS #12 to allow people to spread their keys around all over the place - any product aimed at a mass- market audience that prevents key moving is pretty much dead in the water.
Installing a TCPA chip is not a bad idea.
The only effective thing a TCPA chip gives you is a built-in dongle on every PC. Whether having a ready-made dongle hardwired into every PC is a good or bad thing depends on the user (that is, the software vendor using the TCPA device, not the PC user). Peter.