At 1:30 PM 7/16/96 -0700, Jim Gillogly wrote:
"Deranged Mutant" <WlkngOwl@unix.asb.com> writes:
A problem with a c'punk-style encrypted fs with source code and wide distribution is, of course, that attackers will KNOW that there is a duress key.
Good point. This suggests a design desideratum for any such system should be that the user may choose not to have a duress key, maintaining semi-plausible deniability for those who choose to have one.
Perhaps a user settable number of duress keys with different behavior for each of them? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz | The Internet may fairly be | Periwinkle -- Consulting (408)356-8506 | regarded as a never-ending | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz@netcom.com | worldwide conversation. | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA