-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Matthew Ghio writes:
I thought this might be of interest to cypherpunks. Especially the part about encryption... I would also be interested to know if anyone has dealt with this company (reputation and so on).
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From: LeslieR2@aol.com Message-Id: <9409241357.tn28073@aol.com> Date: Sat, 24 Sep 94 13:57:47 EDT Subject: Re: Anonymous Long Distance Phone Calling
The phone card is used like any other phone cards, instead of making a permanent record of your call with either a calling card or charged to your home phone, you use a pre-paid debit card. Useage is very simple:You first call a toll-free 800 number, and then you will be instructed by the computer ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ sigh. to enter your PIN number. The computer will notify you of how many $ worth of calls you have left. Then you will be able to call your long distance number (U.S. or worldwide) with complete anonymity. The card can be used from any touch-tone phone, at home, the office or on the road from any pay phone without needing any coins. The computer will notify you when you have only one minute left on your card.
This scheme seems to boil down to "trust us, we won't tell" anonymity; much like the C-punk remailers, but it'd get awfully expensive to chain with these cards at $.35/min. There are two opportunities for tracking/ logging - when the cards are purchased, and when the calls are made. ("800" number calls deliver the caller's number to the owner of the 800 number - sometimes immediately, sometimes as part of billing detail.) The cards seem to trade convenience (no pocket full of quarters) for security (they may track purchases after all). There's nothing at all anonymous about them if you don't use them from payphones, or other unsecure public phones. Cards like these are available for cash at Western Union offices, greeting card stores, and truck stops. They're also more likely to be in the $3-20 range instead of $50 or $100 - which is nice, because you shouldn't reuse them if you don't want eavesdroppers to tie your dealings with party A to your dealings with party B. I don't see much value in encryption if it's not end-to-end; seems like most potential eavesdroppers are going to be located on the customer-to-CO link at either/both ends, which won't be encrypted unless you've got crypto gear installed at caller and callee locations .. which makes their product much less interesting. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.5 iQCVAgUBLoSOmH3YhjZY3fMNAQGqwgQAllrwXVa3zNiSaX13AE6H4emSatSBnScZ RaMpiVfaciwMREWr/G/IBCn1uys3BvUGgUS++e6SY4uFSQm22zTr2jI70Kd5SOXc MMWvOxjC1HAev+uw1moROFleIS16ZdPmIsM+NOSHClCY+AuY2fKSUSTSNQuetI1B quE3r6KnSls= =7nVn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----