Bill Frantz <frantz@netcom.com> writes:
At 1:30 PM 7/16/96 -0700, Jim Gillogly wrote:
"Deranged Mutant" <WlkngOwl@unix.asb.com> writes:
A problem with a c'punk-style encrypted fs with source code and wide distribution is, of course, that attackers will KNOW that there is a duress key.
Good point. This suggests a design desideratum for any such system should be that the user may choose not to have a duress key, maintaining semi-plausible deniability for those who choose to have one.
Perhaps a user settable number of duress keys with different behavior for each of them?
I'm not sure what you had in mind for differing behaviours (were you thinking nuking of data variety?), but I think the option for multiple hidden file systems may be a feature some people would want. However, I think it would greatly reduce an individuals plausible deniability of there existing a 2nd hidden file system, if they admit to a 1st hidden file system. They have admitted that they are willing to play the duress key game, so what's to say they haven't done it again. Adam -- #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)