You mean like the 'igor' project I mentioned a while back? I"m accepting suggestions that don't fall into the 'Stick it up your ass' category. Those you can keep :) On Wed, 11 Apr 2001, Ray Dillinger wrote:
Perhaps it is time to consider a new and different mailing list which accepts messages ONLY from remailers. It would be publicly archived and unmoderated just as cypherpunks is, and monitored by the lions just as cypherpunks is, but now that the thought-crime laws are setting in full force, it could provide a forum where there wouldn't be such a simple evidentiary chain from post to poster.
igor (v 0.1) 4-11-01 A remailer for Plan 9 by James Choate ravage@ssz.com http://einstein.ssz.com/hangar18 One of the primary values of the Internet is email. It provides a reliable and consistent link across time and space. It is the proto-typical killer app. However, to use email effectively there should be two additional features. We don't promise more don't exist. The first feature is the ability to reflect or remail a single email to many recipients. The second is to strip identifying header information from the sender prior to the subscriber getting it. igor does not use 'embedded routing commands' like many other anonymous remailer packages. We believe that tampering or altering the body of the email is simply wrong. We offer two way to input data into igor. The first is through Subject: line escaped commands and the second is through additional header files. An example of each is, Subject: Some title or other [igor: some_commands, must_come_last] or, X-igor: some_commands This allows the first remailer to strip the command data out and then process the email as if igor had never been involved. igor supports limited routing selection, which is intended to make traffic analysis harder. igor sends individual emails embedded in igor-specific header info to eliminate as much interaction with the email itself. All inter-igor traffic is encrypted with PK's managed by the Evil Geniuses. With respect to key management, I am not a big believer in current schemes. I don't believe the 'PGP Ring of Trust' is workable because of scaling problems. What I intend is for each remailer to 'know' only a small group of other remailers (limited to three for testing, but the design will support an unlimited number technicaly). So, when igor_1 hands off to igor_2, all igor_2 knows is that he's k in a n-length chain. He subtracts one and randomly selects another igor other than igor_1 to send it to. The remailer igor_2 sends it to, igor_3, will NOT know about igor_1 so it is completely possible that igor_3 may send an email right back to igor_1 for delivery to the recipient. Provided of course that igor_1 and igor_3 have had prior communications. The intent, at least in simple principle, was to allow each key to be 'authorized' to the standards of each operator. I felt this offered a reasonably strong approach and should handle scaling well. On the flip sice, if igor_2 sends covor traffic he won't send it to igor_1 for that mail. I felt that sending igor_1 any sort of traffic was counter productive unless you always sent traffic back to the initiator remailer. This seems 'evil' to me. It's a start... My current problem is deciding what encryption scheme to use for inter-igor relays...? Plan 9 is an operating system developed by the fathers of *nix to 'fix' the problem of *nix. The system has integrated and fully scalable I/O-authorization kernels, process kernels, and file system kernels. Each kernel is connected through a authorization mechanism that doesn't send keys over the network. The low level network layer, Plan 9, is currently implimented with DES. At some point this should be replaced with something a tad more stout. It also needs a mechanism to anonymize file and process space access. Strong crypto is clearly a pre-requisite for this. Once those features are in place a true 'Data Haven' could be easily implimented. Plan 9 is open source and can be obtained from, http://plan9.bell-labs.com The only transvestite operating system in existence, and so what if the bunny is ugly? Route Commands (ie igor: * * ...): strip Strip the From: header zombie Strip the From: header and replace with From: Walking Dead route# Route the message through # other igor nodes, not selectable by the user, where # is from 1 to 3. route0 is assumed and means send to recipient directly cover Provide cover traffic for each outbound email by sending all know igors a single bogus email. This provides n-copy cover traffic. subscribe $ Subscribe to mailing list $ who $ Who is subscribed to list $? info $ Provide info on list $ help Request an info-help file igor Configuration Parameters (igor.conf): MyPubKey This remailers public key, non-traffic related encryption key. Used for encrypting traffic or data. MyOwnKey This remailers private key, non-traffic related de-cryption key. Used for decrypting traffic or data. MyPubRing My public key ring, this contains a mapping of each 'authorized' igor remailer we will operate with. We use this key to encrypt traffic TO the listed remailers. There are no line length limits. e.g. igor@foo.bar#242ds032fdsasetewdvdsasdfewwere... igor@bar.org#2303210343203828353234898324397... cypherpunks@ssz.com#23XD24398dDWSc35K2)3C2#d... ... MyOwnRing My private key ring, this contains a mapping of each 'authorized' igor remailer we will operate with. We use this key to decrypt traffic FROM the listed remailers. GHeader: $ Place this at the beginning of all emails through this remailer GFooter: $ Place this at the foot of all emails through this remailer Open: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will provide all info to any reqeustor List: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will provide info only to a current subscriber Close: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will not provide any info Verify: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists always verify each operation through the Evil Geniuses. ArchDir $ The archive files should go in the $ directory Archive: *, *, *, ... These mailing lists will create an archive file, #.arc User Accounts: igor - remailer contact account (mail address that executes program) master - owner of remailer (a person who receives status and such) undead - another trusted 'igor' remailer Standard Accounts: master:some_user:{list of other users} igor:master:{list of other users} list_name:igor:{lot of subscribers, a file} Copyright 2001 All rights reserved Permission to use for non-commercial purposes only is granted. ____________________________________________________________________ The ultimate authority...resides in the people alone. James Madison The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage@ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------