#ifdef __CYPHERPUNKS fellow cypherpunks -- I'm forwarding you this copy of SURFPUNK that I just produced. It tries to deal with the cypherpunk events of the last few days. If someone has a good summary of all this, a cypherpunk press release, so to speak, I'd love to publish it, too. Also corrections and clarifications and even flames are welcome. Brief info on SURFPUNK -- we cover cypherpunk, cyberpunk, conscious hacking, public policy, what's new on the net, etc. We republish a lot of hard information from other lists. We have some overlap with cypherpunks, but pretty much SURFPUNK is reaching 300 more people. keep practicing, strick strick@versant.com #endif /*__CYPHERPUNKS*/ # Subject: I want my SURFPUNK # # I don't know what happened to my subscription to # SURFPUNK, but I haven't received an issue since # May 5. I'd like to have it back. Thanks. # # -- a concerned surfpunker Whew. It's been a long time. Apologies. I've had a different sort of mailer problems each week. But I hope we're back now to stay. If you haven't received an issue since #0085 on Wed, 5 May 93, you're not missing any. We've been out for a good month. Our address has simplified. We are now simply "surfpunk@versant.com". It used to be "surfpunk@osc.versant.com". You can now drop the "osc". If you are missing surfpunks, or want old backissues, use the "www" (or "xmosaic") server with the Universal Record Locator http://www.acns.nwu.edu/surfpunk/ (and check out the first issue of BLINK while you're there). [ Write <j-germuska@nwu.edu> for more info on BLINK. ] This is a theme issue -- see the first article. --strick ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ 0000000 a55a e970 d8f6 7ea7 3838 6988 5c4e 337c 0000020 ba89 c087 915b 4652 fa21 e20e c5db 3e03 0000040 a856 e161 fa23 50d3 efa9 0641 96c8 50a5 0000060 ee84 beb0 b865 d2d8 8299 f98c 2e97 a2d3 0000100 4df7 db2a 8845 6ea3 1068 a3f8 331f 0c6d 0000120 efe8 4ac7 d0c7 5eb7 f4ce 9434 22f8 c2c6 0000140 d2bd 2db2 40d9 8672 f4f4 f0ed da9f 7393 0000160 b9d2 15d4 e653 d649 a15c 2161 f7bc 62ed ________________________________________________________________________ Subject: _f y__ c_n wr_t_ th_s, g_ t_ j__l From: strick This issue will contain a number of documents relating to cryptography. The last couple of months have seen a lot of action in this realm, and I wish I had a good summary of what the big moves were and what the current status is. It would be difficult, however, to separate the plain fact of what documents say from what they imply and what is really going on behind the scenes. Here's a very brief, highlevel summary, from my own point of view. It's probably not too far off from the consensus at the Mountain View Cypherpunks physical meeting last weekend. It discussses US policy, but it will certainly influence the rest of the world's policies. We seem to be moving from an era when the US policy on cryptography was something like this: Any encryption is legal within the US [ and perhaps Canada ] boundaries, but only very weak encryption can be exported. The restrictions on export may not have made much sense on the surface, but they have sucessfully prevented the really popular products from using encryption. In effect, the available encryption is weak enough that a determined agent, perhaps the U S Government, can easily crack it. The new era might be this: Strong encryption is available within the US, and even mandated in some cases, but only encryption that leaves "escrowed" keys is allowed. The escrowed keys are available to the U S Government. Any other strong encryption is made illegal. How to make encryption illegal is a good question. Any strings of seemingly random numbers could potentially be an encrypted message. Could you imagine going to jail if you cannot decode stray bits? I'm not going to try to convince you that this is the ultimate goal, but I do hope you will try to understand what is happening. A paranoid view is that all of these decisions are already made, and the technology is in place, and now, with only token public debate, the system will be put in place. If this is correct, then President Clinton will be of little help; he is already a strong proponent of the Clipper chip. I don't know if the paranoid view is correct, but it is plausible. Sorry if this isn't a fun issue. I hope the documents I pick are helpful. What's in this issue of SURFPUNK: -- NIST and PKP cross-lisence, to lock public key encryption and the NIST-proposed digitial signature algorithm. About two months ago PKP acquired the Schorr patent, which supposedly covers the DSA algorithm that NIST proposes for digital signatures. -- Opinion by Hal Finney -- Opinion by L. Detweiler -- NIST Crypto Resolutions, Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, June 4, 1993 -- CPSR Crypto Statement to NIST Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, June 1993 -- CPSR Crypto Statement to The Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, June 9, 1993 [ from CuD #5.43 ] For more info, try these resources: ** Usenet groups sci.crypt ** Usenet groups comp.risks (RISKS Forum) ** Usenet groups comp.org.eff.news ** Usenet groups comp.org.eff.talk ** EFF ftp site: ftp.eff.org ** Cypherpunks mailing list: cypherpunk-request@toad.com ** Cypherpunks ftp site soda.berkeley.edu : /pub/cypherpunks ** Computer Underground Digest Usenet group comp.society.cu-digest subscriptions: tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu ANONYMOUS FTP SITES: UNITED STATES: ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in /pub/cud uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu (141.211.182.53) halcyon.com( 202.135.191.2) in /pub/mirror/cud AUSTRALIA: ftp.ee.mu.oz.au (128.250.77.2) in /pub/text/CuD. EUROPE: nic.funet.fi in pub/doc/cud. (Finland) ftp.warwick.ac.uk in pub/cud (United Kingdom) ________________________________________________________________________ 0000200 ff5d 91ce 4fff ad85 57b4 a2a8 b354 9cd0 0000220 ab61 c3f6 ad38 d6dd 7f74 01ad e27e ca2e 0000240 e348 3346 1c03 c629 dfa0 09b7 43f6 f992 0000260 25a1 e863 6f16 49a1 cf88 2fdb 4562 00ec 0000300 b330 9bff 2493 5b5c 59cc 7dbc c0cf 46f2 0000320 888d b538 d02a ae5a 0153 ad8f fd19 8ebb 0000340 f25a 0712 8e87 be58 6e27 b639 21ab ddb7 0000360 4026 b065 f228 bad9 bc7e f407 3713 1246 ________________________________________________________________________ To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: it's official: PKP sells out for Clipper Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 20:19:45 -0600 From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>
From the following document:
PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton on April 16, 1993.
more weasel words:
Notice of availability of this invention for licensing was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government and the public.
what else? ===cut=here=== From: jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: DSA: NIST and PKP come to terms Message-ID: <16860@rand.org> Date: 11 Jun 93 20:56:44 GMT Sender: news@rand.org Organization: Banzai Institute This text was transcribed from a fax and may have transcription errors. We believe the text to be correct but some of the numbers may be incorrect or incomplete. --------------------------------------------------------------------- ** The following notice was published in the Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 108, dated June 8, 1993 under Notices ** National Institute of Standards and Technology Notice of Proposal for Grant of Exclusive Patent License This is to notify the public that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive world-wide license to Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California to practice the Invention embodied in U.S. Patent Application No. 07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm." A PCT application has been filed. The rights in the invention have been assigned to the United States of America. The prospective license is a cross-license which would resolve a patent dispute with Public Key Partners and includes the right to sublicense. Notice of availability of this invention for licensing was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government and the public. Public Key Partners has provided NIST with the materials contained in Appendix A as part of their proposal to NIST. Inquiries, comments, and other materials relating to the prospec- tive license shall be submitted to Michael R. Rubin, Active Chief Counsel for Technology, Room A-1111, Administration Building, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899. His telephone number is (301) 975-2803. Applica- tions for a license filed in response to this notice will be treated as objections to the grant of the prospective license. Only written comments and/or applications for a license which are received by NIST within sixty (60) days for the publication of this notice will be considered. The prospective license will be granted unless, within sixty (60) days of this notice, NIST receives written evidence and argument which established that the grant of the license would not be consistent with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 CFR 404.7. Dated: June 2, 1993. Raymond G. Kammer Acting Director, National Institute Standards and Technology. Appendix "A" The National Institute for Standards and Technology ("NIST") has announced its intention to grant Public Key Partners ("PKP") sublicensing rights to NIST's pending patent application on the Digital Signature Algorithm ("DSA"). Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare its support for the proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for Digital Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending availability of licenses to practice the DSA. In addition to the DSA, licenses to practice digital signatures will be offered by PKP under the following patents: Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Diffie-Hellman") No. 4,200,770 Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Hellman-Merkle") No. 4,315,552 Exponential Cryptographic Apparatus and Method ("Hellman-Pohlig") No. 4,434,414 Method For Identifying Subscribers And For Generating And Verifying Electronic Signatures In A Data Exchange System ("Schnorr") No. 4,995,082 It is PKP's intent to make practice of the DSA royalty free for personal, noncommercial and U.S. Federal, state and local government use. As explained below, only those parties who enjoy commercial benefit from making or selling products, or certifying digital signatures, will be required to pay royalties to practice the DSA. PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton on April 16, 1993. Having stated these intentions, PKP now takes this opportunity to publish its guidelines for granting uniform licenses to all parties having a commercial interest in practicing this technology: First, no party will be denied a license for any reason other that the following: (i) Failure to meet its payment obligations, (ii) Outstanding claims of infringement, or (iii) Previous termination due to material breach. Second, licenses will be granted for any embodiment sold by the licensee or made for its use, whether for final products software, or components such as integrated circuits and boards, and regard- less of the licensee's channel of distribution. Provided the requisite royalties have been paid by the seller on the enabling component(s), no further royalties will be owned by the buyer for making or selling the final product which incorporates such components. Third, the practice of digital signatures in accordance with the DSS may be licensed separately from any other technical art covered by PKP's patents. Fourth, PKP's royalty rates for the right to make or sell products, subject to uniform minimum fees, will be no more than 2 1/2% for hardware products and 5% for software, with the royalty rate further declining to 1% on any portion of the product price exceeding $1,000. These royalty rates apply only to noninfringing parties and will be uniform without regard to whether the licensed product creates digital signatures, verifies digital signatures or performs both. Fifth, for the next three (3) years, all commercial services which certify a signature's authenticity for a fee may be operated royalty free. Thereafter, all providers of such commercial certification services shall pay a royalty to PKP of $1.00 per certificate for each year the certificate is valid. Sixth, provided the foregoing royalties are paid on such products or services, all other practice of the DSA shall be royalty free. Seventh, PKP invites all of its existing licensees, at their option, to exchange their current licenses for the standard license offered for DSA. Finally, PKP will mediate the concerns of any party regarding the availability of PKP's licenses for the DSA with designated representatives of NIST and PKP. For copies of PKP's license terms, contact Michael R. Rubin, Acting Chief Counsel for Technolo- gy, NIST, or Public Key Partners. Dated: June 2, 1993. Robert B. Fougner, Esq., Director of Licensing, Public Key Partners, 310 North Mary Avenue, Sunnyvale, CA 94033 [FR Doc. 93-13473 Filed 8-7-93; 8:45 am] --------------------------------------------------------------------- Forwarded by: -- Jim Gillogly Trewesday, 21 Forelithe S.R. 1993, 20:56 ________________________________________________________________________ 0000400 408c 5e2c 8c0b 8ad6 d941 4bae a2a9 0c4f 0000420 8aee 82fa 2e90 5515 e195 31a9 34d0 103c 0000440 aecc 33d5 7ab8 2f94 ce33 78e4 0419 d967 0000460 2808 d042 0e59 c194 d2d0 d0bc 3299 d18e 0000500 7266 8380 cd47 0372 40a2 9d1f ff6d d234 0000520 69ae 12d4 539c 70cc ac9a 5877 c689 ebeb 0000540 3074 5be2 68ec 3b91 961d 48f0 82c8 dc2d 0000560 bf18 1cd2 edb2 f1d0 1480 80f0 c634 f119 ________________________________________________________________________ From: hal@alumni.cco.caltech.edu (Hal Finney) Date: Fri, 11 Jun 93 22:27:09 PDT To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: PKP sellout? This was my response on sci.crypt to this announcement that PKP will be supporting DSS, and licensing its technology for use by Clipper phones. Thanks to Lance for alerting us to this announcement. ----- jim@rand.org (Jim Gillogly) forwards:
This is to notify the public that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive world-wide license to Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California to practice the Invention embodied in U.S. Patent Application No. 07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm."
And so it appears that another patent jewel will be added to the crown worn by PKP, the de facto owner of cryptographic technology in the United States. They will have an exclusive license to the DSA, as they already do to RSA and most other worthwhile encryption technologies. This also appears to put to rest the much-publicized feud between RSA and NIST/NSA. Conspiracy theorists can now comfortably return to the position that PKP/RSADSI is actually an arm of the NSA, dedicated to restricting and delaying access to strong cryptography as much as possible.
Notice of availability of this invention for licensing was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government and the public.
Once again we are presented with a fait accompli; no other organizations were given an opportunity to bid for the licensing of this patent. The government prefers to see PKP holding the keys to all cryptography in the U.S. Remember how Clipper's technology was similarly assigned to particular corporations on a non-competitive basis?
Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare its support for the proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for Digital Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending availability of licenses to practice the DSA.
And what of the technical objections to DSA/DSS raised in earlier documents by officials of RSADSI, such as in the recent CACM? No doubt those objections are now moot.
PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton on April 16, 1993.
So PKP is now supporting key escrow and Clipper. Can anyone seriously argue that this company is a friend to supporters of strong cryptography? These are dark times indeed. PKP has thrown in with the government, getting behind DSS and Clipper in exchange for exclusive licensing rights. Their ownership of DH and RSA will make it that much harder for any competition to Clipper to arise. If the 60-day comment period really means anything, perhaps public criticism can be effective here. There is much to be concerned about in this announcement. Hal Finney hal@alumni.caltech.edu ________________________________________________________________________ 0000600 c8aa 62f7 811f e878 3616 b536 f59e fe2d 0000620 90fe 7f30 88fd 3576 29bf 9a02 0929 f48b 0000640 51a5 089b 795e 5849 61eb 1a5e f78f 3c6b 0000660 46c2 dd52 ae1b 42bb 926c 6be1 7709 5de3 0000700 0be1 7ae3 d9d4 1421 ca27 c0c0 e202 3814 0000720 850c 5164 74a1 2586 c012 660e f38a 1ba9 0000740 7fd0 dd7a 3608 63de 20ee 94fd c55c ef3d 0000760 41b2 89f9 e373 f2b5 df3e eaf0 142e a17b ________________________________________________________________________ To: cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: PKP sellout = betrayal Date: Sun, 13 Jun 93 00:00:45 -0600 From: ""L. Detweiler"" <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu> S. Bellovin <smb@research.att.com>
I don't see the hand of conspiracy here; rather, I see an encouraging trend, that the private sector is able to compete in cryptographic competence with NSA.
I am encouraged by the pledges to allow non-commercial use -- note the lack of any RSAREF-like interface -- and to engage in non-discriminatory licensing.
By cooperating with NIST on DSA and Clipper, they are implicitly sending the message that the poorly-to-outrageously directed standards making processes for both are wholly acceptable assuming PKP directly profits. That is, that is the weak `nonconspirational' interpretation. The conspirational interpretation is that this announcement is just a blatant indication that PKP, in addition to NIST, is controlled by the NSA. Let me remind everyone that Capstone has a yet-unspecified exchange protocol. Denning suggested on RISKS that Diffie-Hellman (covered by PKP patents) `could be used'. There is some serious evasion going on here. If Capstone is already built, with a public-key algorithm installed, it suggests that PKP has been cooperating on the Clipper/Capstone proposals all along. It will be most interesting to hear announcements on Capstone that announce its key exchange mechanism. PKP `had' the ability to murder Clipper/Capstone in its crib if it so desired, more so than any other single nexus, by denying the right to use public key algorithms (on which it now has a strangling, monopolistic lock). Gad, I can't believe it didn't occur to me to lobby them to do so. In retrospect, it wouldn't have done anything more than heighten the inevitable betrayal. Maybe Mr. Bellovin can clarify how this agreement represents an `encouraging trend in the private sector to compete with the NSA' -- Good lord man, not unless you think that PKP represents the entire private sector in cryptographic applications. Uh, touche' -- you do and it does. Does anybody feel like raiding PKP dumpsters? :( P.S. doubt P.R.Z. will be in a docile mood after hearing this one... ________________________________________________________________________ 0001000 26b5 740f 361d c550 1053 5998 56dc 1e64 0001020 01e9 8f39 a3e2 e991 1e37 bd23 3c9d 07f2 0001040 9892 7e43 17ed bef3 10d0 c9ea 7b1a f2ed 0001060 5b94 23ef d25f ebe4 91d8 b9fc 638b 7704 0001100 adf7 ac9f 412f 7a67 a2a7 9c59 dcf4 135b 0001120 fdfa 3dd3 4656 4ce2 74bc 4fe7 17e4 ec78 0001140 52c3 93e5 4472 1336 7e88 b901 cc76 c18e 0001160 a949 456d 2c94 6c0e 90fc d109 e2ed 224b ________________________________________________________________________ From: Dave Banisar <Banisar@washofc.cpsr.org> Newsgroups: alt.privacy,alt.security,comp.org.eff.talk,sci.crypt,alt.privacy.clipper Subject: NIST CSSPAB Resolutions 6/4/93 Date: 5 Jun 1993 00:48:11 GMT Organization: CPSR Washington Office NIST Crypto Resolutions Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board June 4, 1993 Resolution #1 At Mr. Kammer's request we have conducted two days of hearings. The clear message of the majority of input was that there are serious concerns regarding the Key Escrow Initiative and the Board concurs with these concerns. Many of these issues are still to be fully understood and more time is needed to achieving that understanding. Accordingly, this Board resolves to have an additional meeting in July 1993 in order to more completely respond to Mr. Kammer's request and to fulfill its statutory obligations under P.L. 100-235. The Board recommends that the inter-agency review take note of our input collected, our preliminary finding, and adjust the timetable to allow for resolution of the significant issues and problems raised. Attached to this resolution is a preliminary distillation of the serious concerns and problems. Resolution #2 Key escrowing encryption technology represents a dramatic change in the nation's information infrastructure. The full implications of this encryption technique are not fully understood at this time. Therefore, the Board recommends that key escrowing encryption technology not be deployed beyond current implementations planned within the Executive Branch, until the significant public policy and technical issues inherent with this encryption technique are fully understood. [Attachment to Resolution #1]] - A convincing statement of the problem that Clipper attempts to solve has not been provided. - Export and important controls over cryptographic products must be reviewed. Based upon data compiled from U.S. and international vendors, current controls are negatively impacting U.S. competitiveness in the world market and are not inhibiting the foreign production and use of cryptography (DES and RSA) - The Clipper/Capstone proposal does not address the needs of the software industry, which is a critical and significant component of the National Information Infrastructure and the U.S. economy. - Additional DES encryption alternatives and key management alternatives should be considered since there is a significant installed base. - The individuals reviewing the Skipjack algorithm and key management system must be given an appropriate time period and environment in which to perform a thorough review. This review must address the escrow protocol and chip implementation as well as the algorithm itself. - Sufficient information must be provided on the proposed key escrow scheme to allow it to be fully understood by the general public. It does not appear to be clearly defined at this time and, since it is an integral part of the security of the system, it appears to require further development and consideration of alternatives to the key escrow scheme (e.g., three "escrow" entities, one of which is a non-government agency, and a software based solution). - The economic implications for the Clipper/Capstone proposal have not been examined. These costs go beyond the vendor cost of the chip and include such factors as customer installation, maintenance, administration, chip replacement, integration and interfacing, government escrow systems costs, etc. - Legal issues raised by the proposal must be reviewed. - Congress, as well as the Administration, should play a role in the conduct and approval of the results of the review. ======================================================= NIST Resolutions on Key Escow Issues and Clipper provided by CPSR Washington office 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Suite 303 Washington, DC 20003 rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org ======================================================= ________________________________________________________________________ 0001200 87ce da42 62c0 89bf aae8 c933 f8c2 c29b 0001220 9e7b c03b 3c4f b60e 27b0 1114 2018 d5f7 0001240 2dd0 e567 12aa df8b ae74 86bc aed8 48e4 0001260 5b1e 9e14 5d51 6dca 158a 16ae 4590 87f4 0001300 2bbf d387 bcc6 9e23 aaa9 6af1 591d eb26 0001320 a780 9bbb 85fb 0cef fabe fe9f 2d63 f2ad 0001340 460d 2de6 4e0e 7058 85de bc5e 17f1 4ffb 0001360 006a 3347 8da1 192b 01d3 da57 98ed f6c3 ________________________________________________________________________ Organization: CPSR Civil Liberties and Computing Project From: Dave Banisar <banisar@washofc.cpsr.org> To: CYPHERPUNKS <CYPHERPUNKS@toad.com> Date: Wed, 2 Jun 1993 21:20:10 EST Subject: CPSR NIST Crypto Statement CPSR NIST Crypto Statement Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and Technology Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board Review of Cryptography Policy June 1993 Statement of CPSR Washington office Marc Rotenberg, director (rotenberg@washofc.cpsr.org) with David Sobel, legal counsel, Dave Banisar, policy analyst Mr. Chairman, members of the Advisory Panel, thank you for the opportunity to speak today about emerging issues on cryptography policy. My name is Marc Rotenberg and I am director of the CPSR Washington office. Although CPSR does not represent any computer firm or industry trade association, we speak for many in the computer profession who value privacy and are concerned about the government's Clipper proposal. During the last several years CPSR has organized several meetings to promote public discussion of cryptography issues. We have also obtained important government documents through the Freedom of Information Act. We believe that good policies will only result if the public, the profession, and the policy makers are fully informed about the significance of these recent proposals. We are pleased that the Advisory Board has organized hearings. This review of cryptography policy will help determine if the Clipper proposal is in the best interests of the country. We believe that a careful review of the relevant laws and policies shows that the key escrow arrangement is at odds with the public interest, and that therefore the Clipper proposal should not go forward. Today I will address issues 1 through 3 identified in the NIST announcement, specifically the policy requirements of the Computer Security Act, the legal issues surrounding the key escrow arrangement, and the importance of privacy for network development. 1. CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY The first issue concerns the 1987 statute enacted to improve computer security in the federal government, to clarify the responsibilities of NIST and NSA, and to ensure that technical standards would serve civilian and commercial needs. The Computer Security Act, which also established this Advisory Panel, is the true cornerstone of cryptography policy in the United States. That law made clear that in the area of unclassified computing systems, the Department of Commerce and not the Department of Defense, would be responsible for the development of technical standards. It emphasized public accountability and stressed open decision-making. The Computer Security Act grew out of a concern that classified standards and secret meetings would not serve the interests of the general public. As the practical applications for cryptography have moved from the military and intelligence arenas to the commercial sphere, this point has become clear. There is also clearly a conflict of interest when an agency tasked with signal interception is also given authority to develop standards for network security. In the spirit of the Computer Security Act, NIST set out in 1989 to develop a public key standard FIPS. In a memo dated May 5, 1989 and obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST said that it planned: to develop the necessary public-key based security standards. We require a public-key algorithm for calculating digital signatures and we also require a public-key algorithm for distributing secret keys. NIST then went on to define the requirements of the standard: The algorithms that we use must be public, unclassified, implementable in both hardware or software, usable by federal Agencies and U.S. based multi-national corporation, and must provide a level of security sufficient for the protection of unclassified, sensitive information and commercial propriety and/or valuable information. The Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone configuration, which incorporates the key management function NIST set out to develop in 1989, is very different from the one originally conceived by NIST. % The Clipper algorithm, Skipjack, is classified, % Public access to the reasons underlying the proposal is restricted, % Skipjack can be implemented only in tamper-proof hardware, % It is unlikely to be used by multi-national corporations, and % Its security remains unproven. The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the Computer Security Act. Although intended for broad use in commercial networks, it was not developed at the request of either U.S. business or the general public. It does not reflect public goals. Rather it reflects the interests of one secret agency with the authority to conduct foreign signal intelligence and another government agency responsible for law enforcement investigations. It is our belief that the Clipper proposal clearly violates the intent of the Computer Security Act of 1987. What is the significance of this? It is conceivable that an expert panel of cryptographers will review the Skipjack algorithm and find that it lives up its billing, that there is no "trap door" and no easy way to reverse-engineer. In fact, the White House has proposed just such a review process But is this process adequate? Is this the procedure the Advisory Board would endorse for the development of widespread technical standards? The expert participants will probably not be permitted to publish their assessments of the proposal in scientific journals, further review of the standard will be restricted, and those who are skeptical will remain in the dark about the actual design of the chip. This may be an appropriate process for certain military systems, but it is clearly inappropriate for a technical standard that the government believes should be widely incorporated into the communications infrastructure. Good government policy requires that certain process goals be satisfied. Decisions should be made in the open. The interests of the participating agencies should be clear. Agencies should be accountable for their actions and recommendations. Black boxes and government oversight are not compatible. There is an even greater obligation to promote open decisions where technical and scientific issues are at stake. Innovation depends on openness. The scientific method depends on the ability of researchers to "kick the tires" and "test drive" the product. And, then, even if it is a fairly good design, additional testing encourages the development of new features, improved performance and reduced cost. Government secrecy is incompatible which such a development process. Many of these principles are incorporated into the Computer Security Act and the Freedom of Information Act. The current government policy on the development of unclassified technical standards, as set out in the Computer Security Act, is a very good policy. It emphasizes public applications, stresses open review, and ensures public accountability. It is not the policy that is flawed. It is the Clipper proposal. To accept the Clipper proposal would be to endorse a process that ran contrary to the law, that discourages innovation, and that undermines openness. 2. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES There are several legal and constitutional issues raised by the government's key escrow proposal. The premise of the Clipper key escrow arrangement is that the government must have the ability to intercept electronic communications, regardless of the economic or societal costs. The FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, and the earlier Senate bill 266, was based on the same assumption. There are a number of arguments made in defense of this position: that privacy rights and law enforcement needs must be balanced, or that the government will be unable to conduct criminal investigations without this capability. Regardless of how one views these various claims, there is one point about the law that should be made very clear: currently there is no legal basis -- in statute, the Constitution or anywhere else -- that supports the premise which underlies the Clipper proposal. As the law currently stands, surveillance is not a design goal. General Motors would have a stronger legal basis for building cars that could not go faster than 65 miles per hour than AT&T does in marketing a commercial telephone that has a built-in wiretap capability. In law there is simply nothing about the use of a telephone that is inherently illegal or suspect. The federal wiretap statute says only that communication service providers must assist law enforcement in the execution of a lawful warrant. It does not say that anyone is obligated to design systems to facilitate future wire surveillance. That distinction is the difference between countries that restrict wire surveillance to narrow circumstances defined in law and those that treat all users of the telephone network as potential criminals. U.S. law takes the first approach. Countries such as the former East Germany took the second approach. The use of the phone system by citizens was considered inherently suspect and for that reason more than 10,000 people were employed by the East German government to listen in on telephone calls. It is precisely because the wiretap statute does not contain the obligation to incorporate surveillance capability -- the design premise of the Clipper proposal -- that the Federal Bureau of Investigation introduced the Digital Telephony legislation. But that legislation has not moved forward on Capitol Hill and the law has remained unchanged. The Clipper proposal attempts to accomplish through the standard-setting and procurement process what the Congress has been unwilling to do through the legislative process. On legal grounds, adopting the Clipper would be a mistake. There is an important policy goal underlying the wiretap law. The Fourth Amendment and the federal wiretap statute do not so much balance competing interests as they erect barriers against government excess and define the proper scope of criminal investigation. The purpose of the federal wiretap law is to restrict the government, it is not to coerce the public. Therefore, if the government endorses the Clipper proposal, it will undermine the basic philosophy of the federal wiretap law and the fundamental values embodied in the Constitution. It will establish a technical mechanism for signal interception based on a premise that has no legal foundation. I am not speaking rhetorically about "Big Brother." My point is simply that the assumption underlying the Clipper proposal is more compatible with the practice of telephone surveillance in the former East Germany than it is with the narrowly limited circumstances that wire surveillance has been allowed in the United States. There are a number of other legal issues that have not been adequately considered by the proponents of the key escrow arrangement that the Advisory Board should examine. First, not all lawful wiretaps follow a normal warrant process. It is critical that the proponents of Clipper make very clear how emergency wiretaps will be conducted before the proposal goes forward. Second, there may be civil liability issues for the escrow agents if there is abuse or compromise of the keys. Escrow agents may be liable for any harm that results. Third, there is a Fifth Amendment dimension to the proposed escrow key arrangement if a network user is compelled to disclose his or her key to the government in order to access a communications network. Each one of these issues should be examined. There is also one legislative change that we would like the Advisory Board to consider. During our FOIA litigation, the NSA cited a 1951 law to withhold certain documents that were critical to understand the development of the Digital Signature Standard. The law, passed grants the government the right restrict the disclosure of any classified information pertaining to cryptography. While the government may properly withhold classified information in FOIA cases, the practical impact of this particular provision is to provide another means to insulate cryptographic policy from public review. Given the importance of public review of cryptography policy, the requirement of the Computer Security Act, and the Advisory Board's own commitment to an open, public process, we ask the Advisory Board to recommend to the President and to the Congress that section 798 be repealed or substantially revised to reflect current circumstances. This is the one area of national cryptography policy where we believe a change is necessary. 3. INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY Communications privacy remains a critical test for network development. Networks that do not provide a high degree of privacy are clearly less useful to network users. Given the choice between a cryptography product without a key escrow and one with a key escrow, it would be difficult to find a user who would prefer the key escrow requirement. If this proposal does go forward, it will not be because network users or commercial service providers favored it. Many governments are now facing questions about restrictions on cryptography similar to the question now being raised in this country. It is clear that governments may choose to favor the interests of consumers and businesses over law enforcement. Less than a month ago, the government of Australia over-rode the objections of law enforcement and intelligence agencies and allowed the Australian telephone companies to go forward with new digital mobile phone networks, GSM, using the A5 robust algorithm. Other countries will soon face similar decisions. We hope that they will follow a similar path To briefly summarize, the problem here is not the existing law on computer security or policies on cryptography and wire surveillance. The Computer Security Act stresses public standards, open review, and commercial applications. The federal wiretap statute is one of the best privacy laws in the world. With the exception of one provision in the criminal code left over from the Cold War, our current cryptography policy is very good. It reflects many of the values -- individual liberty, openness, government accountability -- that are crucial for democratic societies to function. The problem is the Clipper proposal. It is an end-run around policies intended to restrict government surveillance and to ensure agency accountability. It is an effort to put in place a technical configuration that is at odds with the federal wiretap law and the protection of individual privacy. It is for these reasons that we ask the Advisory Board to recommend to the Secretary of Commerce, the White House, and the Congress that the current Clipper proposal not go forward. I thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about these issues. I wish to invite the members of the Advisory Committee to the third annual CPSR Privacy and Cryptography conference that will be held Monday, June 7 in Washington, DC at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. That meeting will provide an opportunity for further discussion about cryptography policy. ATTACHMENTS "TWG Issue Number: NIST - May 5, 1989," document obtained by CPSR as a result of litigation under the Freedom of Information Act. "U.S. as Big Brother of Computer Age," The New York Times, May 6, 1993, at D1. "Keeping Fewer Secrets," Issues in Science and Technology, vol. IX, no. 1 (Fall 1992) "The Only Locksmith in Town," The Index on Censorship (January 1990) [The republication of these articles for the non-commercial purpose of informing the government about public policy is protected by section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976] =============================================== ________________________________________________________________________ 0001400 f135 cf93 65f4 004a 2351 719b b2c9 cabe 0001420 c052 c788 2fff b5a3 616c 7fe0 6f45 6fe1 0001440 2005 3c8f 7ca8 29eb ee14 0785 5491 8039 0001460 2035 cc23 1a87 7a6c 4551 7869 7008 1d34 0001500 ac37 e2d2 6bb5 5139 d137 9d38 0727 50af 0001520 fd74 2e07 4bcd 2bc4 200b 4349 d2b0 9151 0001540 b5a2 e493 41d2 c559 9dbc 2a17 61aa cf59 0001560 9aa2 81b6 e41b 13ca 70b6 470c 5cd6 30a7 ________________________________________________________________________ Source: Computer underground Digest Sun June 13 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 43 ISSN: ISSN 1004-043X Date: Sat, 12 Jun 1993 12:30:38 EST From: Dave Banisar <banisar@WASHOFC.CPSR.ORG> Subject: File 2--CPSR Clipper Testimony (6-9-93) in House Subcommittee CPSR Clipper Testimony 6/9 On June 9, 1993, Congressman Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance held an oversight hearing on Rencryption and telecommunications network security. Panelists were Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems, Dr. Dorothy Denning, Steven Bryen of Secure Communications, Marc Rotenberg of the CPSR Washington Office and E.R. Kerkeslager of AT&T. Congressman Markey, after hearing the testimony presented, noted that the Clipper proposal had raised an arched eyebrow among the whole committeeS and that the committee viewed the proposal skeptically. This statement was the latest indication that the Clipper proposal has not been well received by policy makers. Last Friday, the Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board of NIST issued two resolutions critical of the encryption plan, suggesting that further study was required and that implementation of the plan should be delayed until the review is completed. At the Third CPSR Cryptography and Privacy Conference on Monday, June 7, the Acting Director of NIST, Raymond Kammer, announced that the implementation of the proposal will be delayed and that a more comprehensive review will be undertaken. The review is due in the fall. Kammer told the Washington Post that Rmaybe we wonUt continue in the direction we started ous. +------------------------------------------------- Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record of Marc Rotenberg, director CPSR Washington Office on Encryption Technology and Policy Before The Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives June 9, 1993 SUMMARY The cryptography issue is of particular concern to CPSR. During the past several years CPSR has pursued an extensive study of cryptography policy in the United States. CPSR has organized public conferences, conducted litigation under the Freedom of Information Act, and has emphasized the importance of cryptography for privacy protection and the need to scrutinize carefully government proposals designed to limit the use of this technology. To evaluate the Clipper proposal it is necessary to look at a 1987 law, the Computer Security Act, which made clear that in the area of unclassified computing systems, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and not the National Security Agency (NSA), would be responsible for the development of technical standards. The Act emphasized public accountability and stressed open decision-making. In the spirit of the Act, in 1989 NIST set out to develop a public key cryptography standard. According to documents obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST recommended that the algorithm be "public, unclassified, implementable in both hardware or software, usable by federal Agencies and U.S. based multi-national corporation." However, the Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone configuration that resulted is very different: the Clipper algorithm, Skipjack, is classified; public access to the reasons underlying the proposal is restricted; Skipjack can be implemented only in tamper-proof hardware; it is unlikely to be used by multi-national corporations, and the security of Clipper remains unproven. The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the Computer Security Act. Although intended for broad use in commercial networks, it was not developed at the request of either U.S. business or the general public. It does not reflect public goals. The premise of the Clipper key escrow arrangement is that the government must have the ability to intercept electronic communications. However, there is no legal basis to support this premise. In law there is nothing inherently illegal or suspect about the use of a telephone. The federal wiretap statute says only that communication service providers must assist law enforcement execute a lawful warrant. CPSR supports the review of cryptography policy currently underway at the Department of Commerce. CPSR also supports the efforts undertaken by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance to study the full ramifications of the Clipper proposal. However, we are not pleased about the review now being undertaken at the White House. That effort has led to a series of secret meetings, has asked that scientists sign non-disclosure agreements and accept restrictions on publication, and has attempted to resolve public concerns through private channels. This is not a good process for the evaluation of a technology that is proposed for the public switched network. Even if the issues regarding Clipper are resolved favorably, privacy concerns will not go away. Rules still need to be developed about the collection and use of transactional data generated by computer communications. Several specific steps should be taken. First, the FCC should be given a broad mandate to pursue privacy concerns. Second, current gaps in the communications law should be filled. The protection of transactional records is particularly important. Third, telecommunications companies should be encouraged to explore innovative ways to protect privacy. "Telephone cards", widely available in other countries, are an ideal way to protect privacy. TESTIMONY Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on encryption policy and the Clipper proposal. I especially wish to thank you Congressman Markey, on behalf of CPSR, for your ongoing efforts on the privacy front as well as your work to promote public access to electronic information. The cryptography issue is of particular concern to CPSR. During the past several years we have pursued an extensive study of cryptography policy in the United States. We have organized several public conferences, conducted litigation under the Freedom of Information Act, and appeared on a number of panels to discuss the importance of cryptography for privacy protection and the need to scrutinize carefully government proposals designed to limit the use of this technology. While we do not represent any particular computer company or trade association we do speak for a great many people in the computer profession who value privacy and are concerned about the government's Clipper initiative. Today I will briefly summarize our assessment of the Clipper proposal. Then I would like to say a few words about the current status of privacy protection. CLIPPER To put the Clipper proposal in a policy context, I will need to briefly to describe a law passed in 1987 intended to address the roles of the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense in the development of technical standards. The Computer Security Act of 1987 was enacted to improve computer security in the federal government, to clarify the responsibilities of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency, and to ensure that technical standards would serve civilian and commercial needs. The law made clear that in the area of unclassified computing systems, NIST and not NSA, would be responsible for the development of technical standards. It emphasized public accountability and stressed open decision-making. The Computer Security Act also established the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (CSSPAB), charged with reviewing the activities of NIST and ensuring that the mandate of the law was enforced. The Computer Security Act grew out of a concern that classified standards and secret meetings would not serve the interests of the general public. As the practical applications for cryptography have moved from the military and intelligence arenas to the commercial sphere, this point has become clear. There is also clearly a conflict of interest when an agency tasked with signal interception is also given authority to develop standards for network security. In the spirit of the Computer Security Act, NIST set out in 1989 to develop a public key standard FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard). In a memo dated May 5, 1989, obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act, NIST said that it planned: to develop the necessary public-key based security standards. We require a public-key algorithm for calculating digital signatures and we also require a public-key algorithm for distributing secret keys. NIST then went on to define the requirements of the standard: The algorithms that we use must be public, unclassified, implementable in both hardware or software, usable by federal Agencies and U.S. based multi-national corporation, and must provide a level of security sufficient for the protection of unclassified, sensitive information and commercial propriety and/or valuable information. The Clipper proposal and the full-blown Capstone configuration, which incorporates the key management function NIST set out to develop in 1989, is very different from the one originally conceived by NIST. % The Clipper algorithm, Skipjack, is classified, % Public access to the reasons underlying the proposal is restricted, % Skipjack can be implemented only in tamper-proof hardware, % It is Unlikely to be used by multi-national corporations, and % The security of Clipper remains unproven. The Clipper proposal undermines the central purpose of the Computer Security Act. Although intended for broad use in commercial networks, it was not developed at the request of either U.S. business or the general public. It does not reflect public goals. Rather it reflects the interests of one secret agency with the authority to conduct foreign signal intelligence and another government agency responsible for law enforcement investigations. Documents obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act indicate that the National Security Agency dominated the meetings of the joint NIST/NSA Technical Working group which made recommendations to NIST regarding public key cryptography, and that a related technical standard for message authentication, the Digital Signature Standard, clearly reflected the interests of the NSA. We are still trying to determine the precise role of the NSA in the development of the Clipper proposal. We would be pleased to provide to the Subcommittee whatever materials we obtain. LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES There are also several legal and constitutional issues raised by the government's key escrow proposal. The premise of the Clipper key escrow arrangement is that the government must have the ability to intercept electronic communications, regardless of the economic or societal costs. The FBI's Digital Telephony proposal, and the earlier Senate bill 266, were based on the same assumption. There are a number of arguments made in defense of this position: that privacy rights and law enforcement needs must be balanced, or that the government will be unable to conduct criminal investigations without this capability. Regardless of how one views these various claims, there is one point about the law that should be made very clear: currently there is no legal basis -- in statute, the Constitution or anywhere else -- that supports the premise which underlies the Clipper proposal. As the law currently stands, surveillance is not a design goal. General Motors would have a stronger legal basis for building cars that could go no faster than 65 miles per hour than AT&T does in marketing a commercial telephone that has a built-in wiretap capability. In law there is simply nothing about the use of a telephone that is inherently illegal or suspect. The federal wiretap statute says only that communication service providers must assist law enforcement in the execution of a lawful warrant. It does not say that anyone is obligated to design systems to facilitate future wire surveillance. That distinction is the difference between countries that restrict wire surveillance to narrow circumstances defined in law and those that treat all users of the telephone network as potential criminals. U.S. law takes the first approach. Countries such as the former East Germany took the second approach. The use of the phone system by citizens was considered inherently suspect and for that reason more than 10,000 people were employed by the East German government to listen in on telephone calls. It is precisely because the wiretap statute does not contain the obligation to incorporate surveillance capability -- the design premise of the Clipper proposal -- that the Federal Bureau of Investigation introduced the Digital Telephony legislation. But that legislation has not moved forward and the law has remained unchanged. The Clipper proposal attempts to accomplish through the standard-setting and procurement process what the Congress has been unwilling to do through the legislative process. On legal grounds, adopting the Clipper would be a mistake. There is an important policy goal underlying the wiretap law. The Fourth Amendment and the federal wiretap statute do not so much balance competing interests as they erect barriers against government excess and define the proper scope of criminal investigation. The purpose of the federal wiretap law is to restrict the government, it is not to coerce the public. Therefore, if the government endorses the Clipper proposal, it will undermine the basic philosophy of the federal wiretap law and the fundamental values embodied in the Constitution. It will establish a technical mechanism for signal interception based on a premise that has no legal foundation. The assumption underlying the Clipper proposal is more compatible with the practice of telephone surveillance in the former East Germany than it is with the narrowly limited circumstances that wire surveillance has been allowed in the United States. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS There are a number of other legal issues that have not been adequately considered by the proponents of the key escrow arrangement that the Subcommittee should examine. First, not all lawful wiretaps follow a normal warrant process. The proponents of Clipper should make clear how emergency wiretaps will be conducted before the proposal goes forward. Second, there may be civil liability issues for the escrow agents, if they are private parties, if there is abuse or compromise of the keys. Third, there is a Fifth Amendment dimension to the proposed escrow key arrangement if a network user is compelled to disclose his or her key to the government in order to access a communications network. Each one of these issues should be examined carefully. CPSR CONFERENCE At a conference organized by CPSR this week at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace we heard presentations from staff members at NIST, FBI, NSA and the White House about the Clipper proposal. The participants at the meeting had the opportunity to ask questions and to exchange views. Certain points now seem clear: % The Clipper proposal was not developed in response to any perceived public or business need. It was developed solely to address a law enforcement concern. % Wire surveillance remains a small part of law enforcement investigations. The number of arrests resulting from wiretaps has remained essentially unchanged since the federal wiretap law was enacted in 1968. % The potential risks of the Clipper proposal have not been assessed and many questions about the implementation remain unanswered. % Clipper does not appear to have the support of the business or research community. Many comments on the Clipper proposal, both positive and negative as well the materials obtained by CPSR through the Freedom of Information Act, are contained in the Source book compiled by CPSR for the recent conference. I am please to make a copy of this available to the Subcommittee. NETWORK PRIVACY PROTECTION Communications privacy remains a critical test for network development. Networks that do not provide a high degree of privacy are clearly less useful to network users. Given the choice between a cryptography product without a key escrow and one with a key escrow, it would be difficult to find a user who would prefer the key escrow requirement. If this proposal does go forward, it will not be because network users or commercial service providers favored it. Even if the issues regarding the Clipper are resolved favorably, privacy concerns will not go away. Cryptography is a part of communications privacy, but it is only a small part. Rules still need to be developed about the collection and use of transactional data generated by computer communications. While the federal wiretap law generally does a very good job of protecting the content of communications against interception by government agencies, large holes still remain. The extensive use of subpoenas by the government to obtain toll records and the sale of telephone records by private companies are just two examples of gaps in current law. The enforcement of privacy laws is also a particularly serious concern in the United States. Good laws without clear mechanisms for enforcement raise over-arching questions about the adequacy of legal protections in this country. This problem is known to those who have followed developments with the Privacy Act since passage in 1974 and the more recent Video Privacy and Protection Act of 1988. I make this point because it has been the experience in other countries that agencies charged with the responsibility for privacy protection can be effective advocates for the public in the protection of personal privacy. RECOMMENDATIONS Regarding the Clipper proposal, we believe that the national review currently underway by the Computer Security and Privacy Advisory Board at the Department of Commerce will be extremely useful and we look forward to the results of that effort. The Panel has already conducted a series of important open hearings and compiled useful materials on Clipper and cryptography policy for public review. We are also pleased that the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance has undertaken this hearing. This Subcommittee can play a particularly important role in the resolution of these issues. We also appreciate the Chairman's efforts to ensure that the proper studies are undertaken, that the General Accounting Office fully explores these issues, and that the Secretary of Commerce carefully assesses the potential impact of the Clipper proposal on export policy. We are, however, less pleased about the White House study currently underway. That effort, organized in large part by the National Security Council, has led to a series of secret meetings, has asked that scientists sign non-disclosure agreements and accept restrictions on publication, and has attempted to resolve public concerns through private channels. This is not a good process for the evaluation of a technology that is proposed for the public switched network. While we acknowledge that the White House has been reasonably forthcoming in explaining the current state of affairs, we do not think that this process is a good one. For these reasons, we believe that the White House should properly defer to the recommendations of the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board and the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. We hope that no further steps in support of the Clipper initiative will be taken. We specifically recommend that no further purchase of Clipper chips be approved. Speaking more generally, we believe that a number of steps could be taken to ensure that future communications initiatives could properly be viewed as a boost to privacy and not a set-back. % The FCC must be given a strong mandate to pursue privacy concerns. There should be an office specifically established to examine privacy issues and to prepare reports. Similar efforts in other countries have been enormously successful. The Japanese Ministry of Post and Telecommunications developed a set of privacy principles to ensure continued trade with Europe. The Canada Ministry of Communications developed a set of communications principles to address public concerns about the privacy of cellular communications. In Europe, the EC put forward an important directive on privacy protection for the development of new network services. % Current gaps in the communications law should be filled. The protection of transactional records is particularly important. Legislation is needed to limit law enforcement access to toll record information and to restrict the sale of data generated by the use of telecommunication services. As the network becomes digital, the transaction records associated with a particular communication may become more valuable than the content of the communication itself. % Telecommunications companies should be encouraged to explore innovative ways to protect privacy. Cryptography is a particular method to seal electronic communications, but far more important for routine communications could be anonymous telephone cards, similar to the metro cards here in the District of Columbia, that allow consumers to purchase services without establishing accounts, transferring personal data, or recording personal activities. Such cards are widely available in Europe, Japan, and Australia. I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee and would be pleased to answer your questions Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility CPSR is a national membership organization, established in 1982, to address the social impact of computer technology. There are 2,500 members in 20 chapters across the United States, and offices in Palo Alto, California, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington DC. The organization is governed by a board of elected officers and meetings are open to the public. CPSR sponsors an annual meeting and the biennial conference on Directions and Implications of Advanced Computing. CPSR sponsored the first conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy in 1991. CPSR also operates the Internet Library at cpsr.org. The library contains documents from the White House on technology policy and a wide range of public laws covering privacy, access to information, and communications law and is available free of charge to all users of the Internet. Marc Rotenberg is the director of the CPSR Washington office and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center. He is chairman of the ACM Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights, an editor for the Computer Law and Security Report (London), and the secretary of Privacy International, an organization of human rights advocates and privacy scholars in forty countries. He received an A.B. from Harvard College and a J.D. from Stanford Law School, and is a member of the bar of the United States Supreme Court. His forthcoming article "Communications Privacy: Implications for Network Design" will appear in the August 1993 issue of Communications o0f the ACM. ------------------------------ End of Computer Underground Digest #5.43 ************************************ ________________________________________________________________________ 0001600 177c fd13 f000 3011 ccc9 ba18 6823 3cf2 0001620 0811 2a14 eda0 ddbe 7745 d8e1 c6bf ee7e 0001640 fa73 d3ec 9a34 8eea 0598 ff85 2133 d0ec 0001660 e9b1 8cbe add6 a48a 1ae8 80bd efd2 1a9f 0001700 9ba0 d3d6 4e83 2a9f 8dee 2039 cb9c 5ebf 0001720 3d41 6e32 8251 bc3c 4231 4e6c 482f d31e 0001740 6e0e 72dd 164d a663 3d6a 1b44 1a26 9835 0001760 e4c7 2fd7 11d2 6b25 4335 64e8 b746 da0c ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ The SURFPUNK Technical Journal is a dangerous multinational hacker zine originating near BARRNET in the fashionable western arm of the northern California matrix. Quantum Californians appear in one of two states, spin surf or spin punk. Undetected, we are both, or might be neither. ________________________________________________________________________ Send postings to <surfpunk@versant.com>, subscription requests to <surfpunk-request@versant.com>. MIME encouraged. Xanalogical archive access at "http://www.acns.nwu.edu/surfpunk/" ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ /* xor files together, M bytes max */ #include <stdio.h> #define M 9999 char buf[M]; char pad[M]; readin(s) char* s; { int cc; int i; FILE* f= fopen( s, "r" ); if (!f) { perror(s); return; } bzero(buf, sizeof buf); cc= fread( buf, 1, M, f ); for ( i=0; i<M; i++ ) { pad[i] ^= buf[i]; } fclose(f); } printout() { fwrite( pad, M, 1, stdout ); } main(argc, argv) char** argv; { int i; for ( i=1; i<argc; i++ ) { readin ( argv[i] ); } printout(); return 0; } 0002000 e4d8 e725 8869 e54e 1d55 f315 ffd3 e054 0002020 9b15 0f50 f0fd 3b3d 1e1d 13fc 7c4d 3c1b 0002040 1a99 f08b 303f f8d4 b792 123c 0937 7aa0 0002060 d8a3 6670 02a1 5e10 6543 553d 499b a529 0002100 6790 5c24 71a5 0493 aaab c919 1a1a 6616 0002120 c113 41c3 82d1 c7da 4ce8 6af5 a2ab 51f0 0002140 73fe e82f 9daf 776f 1fe6 62d7 ec33 156d 0002160 a0b5 e1b5 7516 499b df25 573f 9bcd ab3c