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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Tue, 23 Jul 1996, Kevin L Prigge wrote:
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 1996 11:02:06 -0500 (CDT) From: Kevin L Prigge <Kevin.L.Prigge-2@tc.umn.edu> To: perry@piermont.com Cc: trei@process.com, cypherpunks@toad.com Subject: Re: Brute Force DES
Perry E. Metzger said:
"Peter Trei" writes:
The fastest general purpose, freely available des implementation I'm aware of is libdes. by Eric Young. With this, I can do a set_key in 15.8 us, and an ecb_encrypt in 95 us/block. That adds up to about 9,000 keytests/sec (this is on a 90 MHz P5, running NT).
I'll point out that like most DES implementations, Eric's tries to spend a lot of time in key setup to save time later on in encryption/decryption. This tradeoff would probably be very different if you didn't plan on trying more than one or two blocks of decryption after getting a key.
For instance if you had a DES encrypted gzipped file. The first 2 bytes plaintext will be Ox1f8b. You'd only have to try to fully decrypt 1 out of 65535 keys.
Buy the point is to prove that DES shouldn't be used, not that it CAN be brute forced. A known-plaintext attack doesn't show that. We hafta attack something we've never seen. (i.e. talk Netscape, or some other company, into generating a DES'd message, and keeping the keys safe) --Deviant Whatever occurs from love is always beyond good and evil. -- Friedrich Nietzsche -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMfXEpjAJap8fyDMVAQGKQQf/VSnWcM4CwKnAuOjASUIkXLPw6CIjhjh5 pg1MQ9+H8phzJexzMj5PyQgC5onSdjXn8CVfSHGK/iFXmUW1ZddkkSJT7g5IAto8 IiN9UY6XitFQMfP6MLgKc8ynd91qE57+NGrknrMopFiBwbh5B7j1zJ6gVWQvrlox BkyJhveuC821Y1ziWXUBtxc+UWhZUHaUtOyUhliXKAGpHv7nOVbYhPeH3r7UzAoR LGs/7uP/9hLGexbpS3WAFcV7yWQAkyaPg3xoGhLGrTO6XLF3dOgp9CW75lZBtuGQ rG3Wj+G/BPIUuls2DvGCsv++SObemtj+Xvw+DLwYF806WMajWQEbpw== =b2PJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----