peter honeyman <honey@citi.umich.edu>
this certainly presents a challenge for the trust web. i suppose the key ring needs a "kill" list.
From: perry@jpunix.com (John A. Perry)
Several of us have been wrestling with a key revocation problem for some time now. Several hours later, I was still playing with PGP and suffered a disk crash. I had not yet had a chance to back up my keyring. Needless to say, I lost the keyring and now I have no way to revoke the key.
I don't get it. The point of revocation is to remove a *compromised* key, one that someone has potentially copied, etc. If there is no chance that the key can be accessed, how is this a problem? I guess the problem is that only one key can be associated with one person (identity) per keyring? Then I would say the thing to do is propagate the new key through the trust network in the same way it was originally established...? This isn't really a deficiency in the software, is it?