I'm attaching the Nando and NYT pieces on the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. As feared yet expected, their effort is turning into another key escrow justification. Anyone who is interested, let me know, I've commented the PCCIP summary report (the full report is classified). I'm one of the few public strong- crypto supporters who also happens to be a professional in the field of infrastructural attacks, so this makes things even more lonely. Michael Wilson http://www.7pillars.com/ ________________________________________________________________________ U.S. cyberterrorism report hit on encryption stance ____________________________________________________________________________ Copyright ) 1997 Nando.net Copyright ) 1997 Reuters WASHINGTON (November 6, 1997 00:53 a.m. EST http://www.nando.net) - The U.S. commission on critical infrastructure drew strong criticism Wednesday for endorsing the Clinton administration's controversial policy that would require government access to all private computer data. Sen. Patrick Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, said significant questions had been raised about the costs and feasibility of so-called key recovery systems. "Until those significant questions are fully considered and answered, we should be cautious in adopting grand key recovery encryption schemes that may only exacerbate system vulnerabilities," Leahy said in a statement. The commission's report, delivered to President Clinton last month and later released to the public in declassified form, warned that critical telephone, power, water and financial systems were becoming increasingly vulnerable to computer attack. The commission also said it favored greater use of computer encryption programs, which use mathematical formulas to scramble information and render it unreadable without a password or software "key." Encryption programs could be used to prevent hackers or terrorists from infiltrating computer networks that run critical infrastructure systems, for example. But the commission backed use of key recovery, a technology to allow law enforcement officials to decode any encrypted message covertly. "Key recovery is needed to provide business access to data when encryption keys are lost or maliciously misplaced, and court-authorized law enforcement access to the plain text of criminal related communications and data lawfully seized," the report said. FBI director Louis Freeh and other law enforcement officials back legislation to require all encryption products to include such features, but many high-tech companies, scientists, and civil libertarians oppose mandatory back-door access to coded information. The Center for Democracy and Technology, an Internet advocacy group, noted that a recent report by cryptography experts found that key recovery features added numerous new vulnerabilities to computer systems. "Key recovery is inconsistent with the (commission's) own calls for greater security in our nation's critical infrastructures," the group said. Robert Marsh, who chaired the commission, defended the report to reporters after a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee's technology and terrorism subcommittee. Marsh contended the report took a balanced view of the encryption debate. "We didn't get into the encryption debate and all the nuances and individual decisions," he said. "We simply came on strong for encryption." In its formal recommendations, the commission urged the government to speed up pilot programs on key recovery, promote efforts to plan for implementing large-scale key recovery systems and encourage private-sector key recovery efforts. ___________________________________________________________________ November 6, 1997 Head of Cyber-Terrorism Panel Says Encryption Rules May Be Needed By JERI CLAUSING Bio WASHINGTON The head of a presidential commission on cyber-terrorism on Wednesday told a Senate panel that a mandatory system guaranteeing third-party access to scrambled computer communications may be necessary if industry does not embrace the Clinton administration's plan for a voluntary encryption decoding system. ________________________________________________________________ Robert T. Marsh, an aerospace consultant and retired Air Force general who is chairman of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, made the remarks in his first non-classified report on the commission's 15-month study and its recommendations for protecting the nation's computer networks from high-tech terrorism. The commission recommended a variety of proposals, including increased private-public partnership and information sharing, more comprehensive background checks on people who hold sensitive positions, strengthening of government computer systems and spending more on research to improve network security. But the key to national security, Marsh said, is strong encryption coupled with a back-door access for law enforcement officials to sensitive communications. "We want to see that adopted over all the critical control functions at an early date," he told the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information. The commission's recommendation for a voluntary system that would give law enforcement officials the ability to decode electronic messages, called a key-recovery system, mirrors that of the administration, which says it wants ensure such officials can gain access to the coded communications of suspected criminals and terrorists. Encryption policy has been a volatile topic on Capitol Hill this year, where bills ranging from an industry-backed ban on key recovery to an FBI-supported mandatory key-recovery scheme have passed various House committees. The Clinton administration insists it supports a Senate bill establishing voluntary key recovery. "We didn't get into the encryption debate and all the nuances of individual positions," Marsh said. "We simply came on strong for encryption. We must have encryption." He told the panel that "we must lower the temperature of the encryption debate" long enough to complete pilot projects on key recovery that will prove to industry that such systems can work. Various agencies of the federal government currently are developing 13 key recovery pilot projects, which were on display Wednesday at a Government Information Technology Services conference. Marsh said the National Security Agency and the National Institutes for Standards and Technology should head efforts to perfect those systems and set standards for a national infrastructure protection office to carry out. Asked by the subcommittee's chairman, Jon Kyl, an Arizona Republican, if those controls should be mandated, Marsh responded: "We think businessmen will find it in their best interest to incorporate these controls. ... Of course, in due time, that may be an option if they are not willing to accept them." Critics blasted the report as premature and contradictory. "I am concerned that the report's recommendations that large-scale key-recovery encryption systems which allow for surreptitious decryption by law enforcement be deployed for use by federal agencies and the private sector is premature," said Senator Patrick Leahy, a Vermont Democrat who has sponsored a bill to relax controls on encryption technology." "Significant questions have been raised by leading cryptographers about the security risks inherent in large-scale key recovery systems, which introduce new vulnerabilities and targets for attack, as well as about the costs and feasibility of implementing such systems." The Center for Democracy and Technology said the "increasing vulnerabilities," "increasing dependence on critical infrastructure," and "wide spectrum of threats" identified by the commission all provide powerful arguments against the deployment of the vastly complex and insecure systems for back-door access that key recovery requires. The center cited a recent study by 11 expert cryptographers and computer security experts, "The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third Parties," which identifies numerous risks in the widespread deployment of such key-recovery plans. Among those risks is insider abuse, which Marsh said so far has been the chief culprit in computer-related crimes. Marsh said a separate section of the report makes "recommendations that try to equip us better to deal with the insider threat, that's a separate problem." ________________________________________________________________ Jeri Clausing at jeri@nytimes.com welcomes your comments and suggestions. ________________________________________________________________ Copyright 1997 The New York Times Company --- For those who want to track this issue further, the PCCIP is at http://www.pccip.gov/