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John Case
On Fri, 6 Nov 2009, StealthMonger wrote:
Please explain other ways to be practically untraceable.
[...]
Never touch the account, save through Tor. So it's the same model you use with a nym-server, but whereas all of your obfuscation is after your email account, all of this obfuscation is prior to the email account (through Tor).
Tor is not practically untraceable. The Tor documentation asserts:
... for low-latency systems like Tor, end-to-end traffic
correlation attacks [8, 21, 31] allow an attacker who can observe
both ends of a communication to correlate packet timing and volume,
quickly linking the initiator to her destination.
http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf
Use of a nym server is practically untraceable because of the high
random latency and mixing with other traffic provided by the
anonymizing remailers through which a nym server is controlled.
-- StealthMonger