The recent CDT policy post sez of Clipper III:
* Access to keys internationally "would be provided in accordance with destination country policies and bilateral understandings."
This reminds me of the understanding between CIA/NSA and their counterparts in British Intelligence. [...]
From a law-enforcement point of view international communications gives
While I am not sure that this oft-made claim can actually be proven, it does raise an interesting point: a large amount of communications traffic crosses international boundaries, which country's laws and procedures are to be followed when a "legitimate law enforcement need" is perceived? While Americans have become somewhat disenchanted with protections given to American suspects via our Fourth Amendment, a possible line of attack upon Clipper III might be that those who want to monitor communications will select the jurisdiction in which it is easiest for them to get a court order. While "coddling criminals" and "throwing out evidence based upon technicalities" has a negative PR value, Americans are a cheuvanistic lot who tend to go completely ballistic when told that they must be subject to the laws of another country, and given the nature of internet communications this might be something which could be used to our advantage. Something like "Clipper III is giving away your First Amendment rights in cyberspace and replacing them with the restrictive expresion laws of Country X, is that what you really want?" The international angle may be a good card to play in the American debate. them little to work with: there are already numerous articles which can be quoted pointing out that terrorists [insert optional horseman] already have access to strong crypto so Clipper III will not catch them, the only thing it is good for is spying on honest Americans... :) jim p.s. On the commercial side, the known economic espionage cases of the French and Japanese governements may also be points to raise.