Instead of having the last remailer in the chain store the plaintext of an encrypted anonymous message, it might be more convenient to have the sender split the message into two messages and send these. The first message would contain random characters, and the second would contain the xor of these random characters with the anonymous message. By themselves, each piece would, of course, be harmless random text, so remailer operators greatest crime would be spamming. If the two pieces were sent through chains with different last remailers, no one operator could be held accountable, and, of course, it would be ridiculous to suggest that one operator could be held responsible for that fact that another sent some random text which happened to be the xor of the random text another had sent with a harassing message. (For instance, the other operator could be trying to frame the first, with the help of the receiver.) It seems to me that the only way to deal with a remailing scheme of this kind would be outlaw anonymous remalining in general. Leonard