Mark Grant <mark@unicorn.com> writes:
aba@dcs.ex.ac.uk wrote:
We didn't say: "don't have disaster recovery for stored data." (Well I didn't and I don't think Mark did either).
Yep. While there are much better options, I think PGP's CMR would be a tolerable short-term solution for stored data. The problem is that it's not for stored data, it's for email (or so 'Commerical MESSAGE Recovery') would imply.
Note that solely using CMR for stored data would not require that the CMR 'feature' be built into freeware or personal versions of PGP, but only into the corporate version. That in itself would be a big win.
PGP 5.5 currently has CMR for stored data AND comms data (if you set it up to have CMR). CMR for stored data only is much safer from government abuse. I think even CMR for just stored data is kind of dumb in that it doesn't work very well. Consider a day in the life of a typical Joe Luser (who can't remember a password to save his life). He's been using this spiffy new pgp5.5 (or your suggested 5.6 with CMR storage recovery, but with no CMR message recovery).. he has PGP encrypted files scattered everywhere. On backup tapes in the fire-proof safe, on floppies, on the disk, on the disk inside `.zip' files `.tar' files, on the optical duke box (full of write-once worm CDs), etc. etc He forgets his password (for the third time that month). He needs all those files back _now_ because there's a deadline, and there's going to be serious shit flying if it doesn't get finished. So now what? The admin has to come along and recover them all for Joe. He'll be there for the duration if he's got to re-encrypt half of the 2Gb disk (it'll be _slow_ with public key crypto, which PGP Inc insists on using even for single user storage applications, but we'll save up that rant for another post). Could easily take an hour or so before he's through. Probably he'll miss some because they are inside `.zip' files, etc. And then half an hour after the admin has finished Joe Luser will accidentally delete that important report. Then the admin gets called in again because Joe remembered he had another backup of it inside a zip file, which he can't read because it's encrypted to his old key. Key recovery would be simpler. Just encrypt the private half of Joe's key with the Admins key. Leave it on Joe's disk, or chuck a copy in the company safe. Then when Joe has another memory lapse, the admin can be done in 5mins. That means that the company could now read stuff on Joe's disk. PGP Inc seems to view this prospect with horror as if it is a privacy invasion. But that's what CMR in pgp5.5 used for storage allows too. I can't see that it makes much difference how the company gets access -- they can read all the data either way. (If Joe has some private files he can encrypt them with another key. A progressive crypto vendor would include facilities for separate keys, some recoverable, some not.) And frankly the company is in a much better to snoop through the workstations files anyway; Joe's technically clueless, they own the machine, they installed the software, they have access to the machine when he's not there. Not much you can do against that threat. PGP sees that threat, and it's response is to implements CMR? Somehow it is ok to read data if the users key never gets revealed to the company? Can't see that it makes much difference personally, the data is the interesting stuff, keys are just random numbers. But at the same time with CMR for message recovery the recovery information is being sent over the wire. Now why would you want to send recovery info over the wire? To make the attacker's job easier? Jeeze. Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`