UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO William H. Payne ) Arthur R. Morales ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v ) CIV NO 97 0266 ) SC/DJS ) Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF ) Director, National Security Agency ) National Security Agency ) ) Defendant ) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BASED ON EVIDENCE FROM ADMISSIONS 1 COMES NOW plaintiffs Payne [Payne] and Morales [Morales] [Plaintiffs], pro se litigants to exercise their rights guaranteed under the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the court may know, Rule 26 (b)(1) Parties may obtain discovery regarding any mater, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and LOCATION of any books documents, or other tangible thing and the identity and location of persons have knowledge of any discoverable matter. Rule 36 states, Request for admission (a) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for the purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. Copies of documents shall be served with the request unless they have been or otherwise furnished or made available for inspection and copying. The request may WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT, be served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any other party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that party. ... Plaintiffs capitalize WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT. 2 Rule 36 states, {T]he matter IS ADMITTED unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or with such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection address to the matter signed by the party or by the party's attorney, ... Plaintiffs capitalize IS ADMITTED. 3 PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR ADMISSION TO NSA DIRECTOR KENNETH MINIHAN were served I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing request for admissions was mailed to Jan Elizabeth Mitchell, Assistant US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Monday November 3, 1997. More than 30 days elapsed and Plaintiff's have received no response from Minihan or Mitchell. Therefore, Minihan ADMITS 1 NSA is involved in 'spiking' [modifying the advertised intended functions] electronic equipment. 2 NSA 'spiked' Iranian and Libyan cryptographic units so that the cryptographic key was transmitted with the cipher text. 3 Iranian messages were given to Iraq during the Iran/Iraq war. 4 NSA was involved in the conviction, by giving contents of secret messages, of Ali Vakili-Rad and Masour Hendi to the Court in Paris in the trial for the stabbing death of Shapour Baktiar. 5 Minihan knows where copies of intercepted messages are kept at NSA. 4 Requests for First set of Admission were mailed October 13, 1997. More than 30 days has elapsed. No response from lawyer Mitchell or respondents were received by Plaintiffs. Therefore, NSA employee Brian Snow ADMITS 1 He designed the cryptographic algorithm for the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit (MSCU). 2 NSA funded the MSCU at Sandia labs. 3 In about 1983 he gave a presentation at NSA FANX building to some Sandians involved with the Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit. 4 In the presentation he showed electronic schematics of the units to the Sandians. 5 He told the Sandians about the electronic and operational problems NSA had with the cryptographic units he bought with him. 6 He told the Sandians that one of the cryptographic units failed in the Moscow embassy and transmitted clear text. 7 He concluded his talk telling the Sandians that NSA had no operational failures once NSA went to dual redundant cryptographic units. 8 He told the Sandians not to ask for a theoretical reason why dual redundant cryptographics never failed, in the sense of releasing classified data, but that this was based on practical experience. 9 William H. Payne was one of the Sandians in the audience of his talk. 10 He sat across the table from William H. Payne at lunch in the cafeteria in the basement of the FANX building directly after his talk. 11 He was involved in algorithms associated with the Clipper project. 12 He where the documents specifying the MSCU algorithm are located at NSA. 13 He knows where the documents specifying algorithms associated with the Clipper project are located at NSA. NSA employee Thomas White ADMITS 15 He served as the liaison between NSA and Sandia for the Deployable Seismic Verification System. 16 He forwarded documents such as NSA's Orange book and the public key Firefly chip to Sandia. 17 He told Bill Payne that NSA regarded former president Ronald Reagan as one of the US's greatest traitors. 18 He told Bill Payne that the reasons NSA regarded Ronald Reagan as one of the US's greatest traitors is that Reagan, on TV announced to the world that the US was reading Libyan communications. 19 He Bill Payne that the following day [after Reagan's TV announcement] NSA could no longer read Libyan communications. 20 He knows where the documents specifying Benincasa's correction to the original USO seismic data authentication algorithm are located at NSA. NSA employee Mark Unkenholtz ADMITS 21 He visited Sandia in about 1986-87 with R division employee Ed Georgio to discuss which data authentication algorithm should be used for the US/USSR deployable seismic verification system (DSVS). 22 He and Bill Payne discussed using public key for the DSVS system. 23 He concluded that there were too many problems with public key so it was best to continue using the old Benincasa USO (unmanned seismic observatory) algorithm. 24 In 1989 he and others asked Bill Payne to write a memorandum to NSA deputy director James J. Hearn requesting help from NSA to develop new data authentication algorithms. 25 He did this is because R division needed a letter of support for more funding. 26 The DRAFT letter he asked Payne to write is seen on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies. 27 He asked Payne to fax the DRAFT letter to his fiancee, Amy Johnston, since NSA did not have fax for unclassified work readily available to use. 28 The "To Mark and Ed, R" on page 183 of SAND91-2201 UC 706 addressed him and his boss boss at the time, Ed Donohue. 29 He told Payne that NSA takes about a year to evaluate an encryption/authentication algorithm before it can be distributed for use. 30 He told Payne, in a response to a question from Payne, that NSA runs crypto algorithms through statistical tests. 31 After Payne wrote the Appendix T memorandum, NSA sent a delegation to Sandia. 32 He and NSA employee Scott Judy designed a replacement algorithm for Beninicasa's USO algorithm. 33 The replacement algorithm was code named GRANITE. 34 The GRANITE design addressed some of the deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter to Hearn. 35 The GRANITE design addressed some of the deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter to Hearn. 36 He knows where the documents specifying Benincasa's to the original USO seismic data authentication algorithm are located at NSA. 37 He knows where the documents specifying his and Judy's GRANITE algorithm are located at NSA. NSA employee Scott Judy ADMITS 38 He met Payne at Sandia sometime after he wrote the DRAFT letter on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies. 39 He later met Payne again at NSA in a meeting. 40 He told Payne that NSA bases its cryptographer algorithm on principles other than mathematics. 41 He and NSA employee Mark Unkenholtz designed a replacement algorithm for Beninicasa's USO algorithm. 42 His replacement algorithm was code named GRANITE. 43 GRANITE design addressed some of the deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter to Hearn. 44 The number stepping on the internal registers of GRANITE was decreased in response to deficiency 2 enumerated in the June 21, 1989 letter to Hern. 45 He knows where the documents specifying Benincasa's correction to the original USO seismic data authentication algorithm are located at NSA. 46 He knows where the documents specifying his and Unkenholtz's GRANITE algorithm are located at NSA. NSA employee Edward Donohue ADMITS 47 He met Payne at Sandia sometime after he wrote the DRAFT letter on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies. 48 He was head of NSA's R division cryptographic algorithms division in 1989. 49 He knows where 1 Benincasa's original NSS/USO algorithm, 2 Benincasa's revision of 1, 3 The Unkenholtz - Judy GRANITE algorithm, 4 Brian Snow's MSCU algorithm, 5 the clipper algorithms, 6 the STU III algorithms. written specifications are located at NSA. NSA employee Paul Bridge ADMITS 50 He assumed liaison control from NSA employee Tom White for the US/USSR seismic data authenticator. 51 He placed a copy of WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CONCERNING RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY AT SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORY Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the National Security Agency (NSA) have established a working relationship which has gown substantially over the last decade. Currently, there exist several joint project areas of mutual interest. Different policies and administrative procedure exist at SNL and NSA which govern the handling of sensitive and classified material, and the documentation and dissemination of such work. It is the purpose of the Agreement to specify the general guidelines under which work will be administered in the area of cryptography research at SNL. First, SNL, in its role as systems integrator, requires and indigenous cryptographic capability to support its Department of Energy mission in the design and development of safe and secure nuclear weapons and in treaty verification. SNL and NSA agree to a cooperative effort to support SNL's needs in a manner consistent with the role of such work to national security. Second, NSA, in its role as the U.S. Government approval authority for cryptographic systems developed for and used in national security applications, recognizes its responsibility to provide support and guidance to SNL's activities in applying cryptography. Third, SNL will regard cryptographic research work as classified when it is initiated or created, i.e., will protect such work as "created classified", and will consult with NSA prior to handling such work as unclassified. Periodic technical and managerial discussions between SNL and NSA will be held to increase the awareness of the security concerns of both organizations and to develop and maintain an SNL cryptographic classification guide which will protect the national security interests of both organizations. This working agreement shall be effective on the date of the last signature and will be reviewed annually by SNL and NSA. It will be valid until terminated by mutual agreement. AGREED: ALBERT NARATH RADM JAMES S. MCFARLAND (USN) President Plans and Policy TITLE TITLE SANDIA NATIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY LABORATORIES June 10, 1991 22 July 1991 DATE DATE which is now seen on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997. 52 His purpose of giving Payne a copy of the Narath/MacFarland agreement an attempt to threaten Payne. 53 He told Payne that Sandia must regard the US/USSR Deployable Seismic Verification System (DSVS) authenticator as classified and get permission from NSA to place the unit in the field. 54 He told Payne that Sandia must have the DSVS authenticator TEMPEST tested . 55 He agrees Payne responded to him that the previous unit had already passed TEMPEST testing and that Payne's Sandia project leader, H. B. [Jim] Durham, did not want to spend the money to repeat the testing. 56 He told Payne that NSA should be getting the capability to build cryptographic devices. NSA employee Rick Proto ADMITS 57 He and group of other NSA employees met Sandians H. B. Durham, Ron Moya, and William Payne at NSA at Fort George G. Meade in about 1986 to discuss, in part, implementation of the Deployable Seismic Verification System data authenticator. 58 He and other NSA employees directed that the NSA Unmanned Seismic Observatory data authenticator algorithm designed by NSA employee Ronald Benincasa be implemented entirely in hardware. 59 He and the other NSA employees at the meeting, directed that the data authenticator be enclosed in a TEMPEST enclosure. Sandians expressed objection to the TEMPEST enclosure in that the authenticator was housed in a steel tube buried about 100 meters beneath ground surface. 60 He agrees that he and NSA employee Robert Morris met with Sandia cryptographer G. J. Simmons when Simmons asked them both the two questions: 1 NSA is sorry it delegated cryptographic implementation responsibility to Sandia for nuclear weapons; 2 NSA is trying to take back this responsibility? 61 He and/or Morris refuse to respond to Simmons' above question. Retired Sandia Employee Gustavus J Simmons ADMITS 62 He with Sandia Paul Stokes designed a data authentication algorithm for seismic treaty verifications in the early 1970s. 63 He and Stokes either patented, tried to patent, or contemplated patenting their authentication algorithm. 64 NSA, when we presented their seismic data authentication algorithm to the Agency, rejected its use. 65 He know that NSA gave Sandia the data authentication algorithm designed by NSA employee Ronald Benincasa to use in seismic verification rather than use your and Stokes algorithm. 66 He feels that the algorithm that he and Stokes proposed is as good or better than Benincasa's algorithm. 67 He feels that NSA demanding Sandia use Benincasa's algorithm could be a case of Not-invented-here as opposed to technical advantages over his and Stokes algorithm. 68 In about 1986 he gave a presentation in Sandia spook-shop building 868 to promote the use of public key cryptography for use in the Deployable Seismic Verification System. 69 No one, until he received a copy of Payne's technical report in 1992, SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the Deployable Seismic Verification System told him what algorithm and authentication technology was used. 70 He asked NSA employees Rick Proto and Robert Morris to the effect, 1 NSA is sorry it delegated cryptographic implementation responsibility to Sandia for nuclear weapons; 2 NSA is trying to take back this responsibility. 71 Proto or Morris did not answer his questions. 72 He retired before he planned from Sandia Labs. 73 He felt that NSA exerted some pressure on Sandia to have him retire. 74 He told William Payne on the phone that he was forced into early retirement as a result of NSA pressures. 75 He felt that some NSA algorithms do not are properly classifiable. 76 He felt that NSA abuses classification with regard to cryptography. 77 He feels that cryptography, by its 'slippery math' basis, is difficult, if not impossible, to regulate. Sandia employee D. Jerry Allen ADMITS 78 He was a supervisor Sandia's weapons components department. 79 NSA has responsibility for furnished Sandia the cryptographic algorithms and approving the implementation technology which went into the electronic locks in the US nuclear arsenal. 80 He told William Payne in about 1991-92 that it cost $300,000 per nuclear bomb to recall bombs to Pantex to remove and repair Sandia's failing semiconductor chips. Sandia employee Ronald Kulju ADMITS 81 He worked in Sandia weapons components department in about 1986/7. 82 He was working on a project which involved use of the Cylink corporation CY 1024 public key cryptography semiconductor chip. 82 He made an agreement in about 1986/7 with Payne. He would design the hardware oscillator for the CY 1024 if Payne would try to get CY 1024 to communicate with an 80c51 microcontroller using synchronous Mode 0 communications. 83 He told Payne that Sandia's public key cryptography chips did not get the same answers as the CY 1024. 84 He told Payne that NSA and Sandia was in the process of removing the public key cryptography from weapons systems. 4 Admissions reveal that NSA employees KNOW where the lawfully requested documents reside. And that NSA has EMBARRASSING problems with its cryptographic algorithms. 5 Rule 56 states. Summary Judgment states, The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs capitalize NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. Admissions attest to the contention that there are NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT. WHEREFORE, 6 Replace judges Svet and Campos because these judges have demonstrated, IN WRITING, they do not follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 Award Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as a matter of law based on admissions. 8 Have replacement judges ORDER Defendant to produce immediately produce documents in machine-readable format for publication on Internet. In preparation for settlement of this unfortunate bungled spy sting. And analysis of 'deficient' NSA cryptographic algorithm work designed to get the US government out of the cryptography business. 9 grant such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Respectfully submitted, _________________________ William H. Payne 13015 Calle de Sandias NE Albuquerque, NM 87111 _________________________ Arthur R. Morales 1024 Los Arboles NW Albuquerque, NM 87107 Pro se litigants CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing memorandum was mailed to Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, Director, National Security Agency, National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 and hand delivered to Jan E Mitchell, Assistant US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Monday December 22, 1997. 13