Forwarded message:
Again they knew something was up, just not where.
You may well be right, but there are seemingly serious historians who claim otherwise. Since you have studied the subject for 30 years I would be interested in your comments on the book 'Infamy' by John Toland (1982).
I like Toland a lot. I do not accept what he says without reservation.
I remember being very taken by his arguments when I read it. He has extensively studied the protocols from the post war hearings and military court proceedings dealing with the subject (and they were plentiful) interviewed many of the involved persons years after.
The war trials for the Japanese were compromised by a variety of political intrigues. Ranging from political issues regarding the best way to govern the war torn country (ie can't kill too many of them or the Japanese will simply pick up weapons again with an estimated 1,000,000 US dead as a result) to the biological weapons that were developed which were quite useful for the Allies sans the Soviets.
According to Toland:
The US president, selected members of his cabinette and a few admirals and generals knew - from Magic and the 'winds' execute, radio traffic analysis, diplomatic sources, double agents - exactly when and where the Japaneese were going to attack, but didn't warn Hawaii, fearing that too efficient counter-measures by the Oahu military might make the attack abort and so not convince the isolationists. The unexpected tactical capabilities of the Japaneese armada then made a cover-up all the more important.
Hawaii appears in *NO* MAGIC transmissions of that time period. If you, Toland, or anyone else can give specifig MAGIC intercepts I would be greatly appreciative. The MAGIC intercepts did mention Borneo, The Ka Peninsula, and the Phillipines (where the B-17's were headed that were destroyed at Pearl). The radio traffic analysis, ship movement analysis, etc. did not point to a specific target (how could they considering the breath of the Japanese opening attacks all over the Pacific) only that the Japanese were serious. The isolationists were never convinced (eg Lindbergh) that war was the right thing to do. There was nothing unexpected about the tactics. There were two previous test of shallow water torpedo attacks, both successful. The first was by the British and the second was by the US at Pearl (how is that for irony?) which was attended by Japanese observers. The heads of state and military did not seriously believe Hawaii was a realistic target and therefore looked elsewhere. Sun Tzu says the first target in war is your opponents mind, the Japanese took it to heart. Jim Choate