At 11:37 AM 5/29/96 +0200, Anonymous wrote:
Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 10:03:11 -0700 X-Sender: bstout@osc.hidata.com To: Firewalls@GreatCircle.COM, Return requested <firewalls@GreatCircle.COM> From: Bill Stout <bill.stout@hidata.com> Subject: Re: Encryption Technology Sender: firewalls-owner@GreatCircle.COM
Extrapolations of fact: 1. Internet traffic is monitored. 2. The ability to snoop for encrypted traffic is present 3. The ability to identify encryption levels is present (How else can they differentiate DES-1 from DES-3?) 4. The ability to crack DES-1 in near real-time mode is present. (See above). 5. If above=true, then Feds dropping the Zimmerman PGP case probably also points to it also being crackable in a similar manner. Bill
I think the Feds non-prosecution of Zimmermann had absolutely nothing to do with the crackability/non-crackability of PGP. They just had an extremely weak case: They probably had no way to demonstrate that any particular person exported PGP, which means that prosecuting Zimmermann would have looked like sour grapes. (or, in the alternative, if they had records to show that PGP was exported, they might not have wanted to reveal the extent of their Internet monitoring.) Jim Bell jimbell@pacifier.com