-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 John Case <case@sdf.lonestar.org> writes:
On Fri, 6 Nov 2009, StealthMonger wrote:
Please explain other ways to be practically untraceable.
[...]
Never touch the account, save through Tor. So it's the same model you use with a nym-server, but whereas all of your obfuscation is after your email account, all of this obfuscation is prior to the email account (through Tor).
Tor is not practically untraceable. The Tor documentation itself asserts the contrary: ... for low-latency systems like Tor, end-to-end traffic correlation attacks [8, 21, 31] allow an attacker who can observe both ends of a communication to correlate packet timing and volume, quickly linking the initiator to her destination. http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf In contrast, the "obfuscation" attained with a nym server is attributable precisely to the high random latency and traffic mixing of the anonymizing remailers through which the nym is operated. -- StealthMonger <StealthMonger@nym.mixmin.net> -- stealthmail: Scripts to hide whether you're doing email, or when, or with whom. mailto:stealthsuite@nym.mixmin.net Finger for key. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.5.8+ <http://mailcrypt.sourceforge.net/> iD8DBQFK9UJwDkU5rhlDCl4RAkthAKCzG9+lzLAzI+CFIFYaQdP9r01+2gCeJmSy cYvfqqeB96SQ5La51GM1WrQ= =5+Ix -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----