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John Case
On Fri, 6 Nov 2009, StealthMonger wrote:
Please explain other ways to be practically untraceable.
[...]
Never touch the account, save through Tor. So it's the same model you use with a nym-server, but whereas all of your obfuscation is after your email account, all of this obfuscation is prior to the email account (through Tor).
Tor is not practically untraceable. The Tor documentation itself
asserts the contrary:
... for low-latency systems like Tor, end-to-end traffic
correlation attacks [8, 21, 31] allow an attacker who can observe
both ends of a communication to correlate packet timing and volume,
quickly linking the initiator to her destination.
http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf
In contrast, the "obfuscation" attained with a nym server is
attributable precisely to the high random latency and traffic mixing
of the anonymizing remailers through which the nym is operated.
-- StealthMonger