----------- [...] (Unknown) My name is Barbolin (?) from GRC (?). I have a question concerning the algorithm that is used in the Clipper Chip, Skipjack..[]..There is a certain amount of conjecture that in fact the algorithm contains a deliberately encoded weakness that will allow the NSA, without access to the escrow keys, to be able to intercept communication in their mission to monitor on- shore and off-shore communications..[].. BAKER I'll answer it yes or no if you'll tell me exactly the question. UNKNOWN Does it or does it not contain a weakness that allows you to intercept the communications without access to the escrow keys. BAKER No. ----------- ObNit: As has been said before by others, there's more to Clipper/EES than just the Skipjack algorithm. I think simply asking if "the [Skipjack] algorithm contains a deliberately encoded weakness" leaves too much room for a "truthful" No answer. People have posted descriptions of mechanisms that could be used to leak key information which do not rely on a deliberately weakened encryption algorithm. (depends on how broadly you define "algorithm"). A better question to ask would be... Are there any software or hardware mechanisms, or combinations of software and hardware mechanisms, present in the Clipper/EES system that supports or enables decryption of intercepted Clipper/EES communications without access to escrowed unit keys? Does that cover it well enough? Jim_Miller@suite.com