On Mon, 3 Jun 1996 ichudov@algebra.com wrote:
rick hoselton wrote:
You might also want to ask Ivan Boeskey(sp?). I think he's out of
Boesky.
Which brings up another ignorant question: suppose that I am a corporate officer who does receive substantial "insider" information, for example results of audits, before they become public. What would prevent such an insider from creating a phony offshore trading company, and sending orders to that company using cypherpunks technology?
The threat of discovery and punishment? Your mileage may vary.
If we suppose that the agent executing trades (which may even be a computer, afaik) is trustworthy, the methods to deliver trade orders are reliable, the computers are protected from van eyck monitoring, and the officer is not spending too much money openly, what is there to prevent or prove such violations of the law?
Paper trails, informants, corrupt foreign officials, plants, attacks on voice calls between the U.S. and the company, the internal corporate calls. Anything that law enforcement is used to using. It'd be the IRS that you had to really watch for. SEC tends to give up on said programs. I discuss concealing insider trading in my longish work on the subbject of asset concealing.
For example, the trading computer can have pseudonym address xyz@alpha.c2.org, forwarded through a chain of remailers to place_order@offshore.com.xx, and the officer sends pgp signed and encrypted trade orders to that address, again through remailers. What besides traffic analysis is there to stop such violations?
Thanks,
- Igor.
--- My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell@pacifier.com