At 09:32 PM 10/31/02 -0800, Tim May wrote: ...
If the attackers/hijackers cannot get into the cockpit and gain control of the plane, then the most they can do with disabling/lethal/nerve gases is to cause the plane to essentially crash randomly...which kills a few hundred people, but probably not many more.
Which is yet another reason why securing the cockpit door very, very well is the single most important, and cheapest, solution.
Hmmm. I agree, but if the attackers chose the right time (while the plane's on autopilot) to release the gas or whatever, they might have an hour or two to get through the cockpit door, with no resistance at all from the now-dead passengers or crew. Securing a cockpit door in those circumstances is *much* harder than securing it against someone with a shorter time to get through, and with the possibility of active resistance from the other side. (I seem to recall hearing some pilot comment that he was very confident of his ability to keep someone from breaking through the door, just by flying so that it's almost impossible to stay on your feet. Certainly, trying to use a hacksaw or cutting torch or something wouldn't be much fun while the pilot did loops or something.) On the other hand, the pilot or copilot pretty much just have to figure out something is wrong and indicate this fact to the people on the ground, and there will be a plane along shortly to shoot them down if necessary. And I don't think this kind of gassing attack would work all that smoothly in practice--some people would be affected before others, due to nonuniformity in the way air is distributed in the cabin and different levels of susceptibility. The combination of a hard-to-break-into cockpit and some kind of response to prevent these planes being used as low-tech cruise missiles seems like a win. Maybe it would make sense to add some kind of remote surveilance of the cockpit, though I imagine this wouldn't be too popular with pilots, and they'd definitely need to secure the channel properly.
--Tim May --John Kelsey, kelsey.j@ix.netcom.com // jkelsey@certicom.com