Rich, [I've CCed this to cypherpunks, as well, I hope that you don't mind.] In Article: <Pine.ULT.3.91.960127010243.19154N-100000@Networking.Stanford.EDU>, Rich Graves <llurch@networking.stanford.edu> wrote: # On Sat, 27 Jan 1996, Stephen P. Gibbons wrote: # > If this is the case (and I don't have a source license at this point, or # > even a system that will run Java) there is the possiblility that a sytem # > with control of a web server and a DNS server could coerce a Java client # > into initiating TCP connections to clients other than the system that # > provided the applet (which should be a prohibited behavior, as I read the # > specs.) # If I understand you correctly, this is only true if neither your stack nor # your client caches DNS queries. One or the other almost always does, at # least for a minute, no matter how low you set TTL. Yes, a client that cache's DNS queries can get in the way somewhat. I've already considered this, and the "devious applet" would take advantage of Java's capability to use multiple threads (one of which would sleep() for whatever period of time was necessary to invalidate the cache, and _then_ initiate the attack.) Yes, there are are various other specific cases that need to be considered in order to make the attacking app (if it's even feasable) work all of (or a good percentage of) the time. It would be very easy to conceal the "devious" portion of the applet inside of trojan horse that ran for a length of time greater than the minimum TTL for DNS caching. -- Steve@AZTech.Net