I don't recall having posted to this list before, but I am a truly
supportive lurker as it were, doing my bit to sow seeds of crypto-anarchy
at the layperson level to many friends.
Anyway, in light of today's foreboding announcement from the White House, I
thought you might be interested in this blurb from the EFF.
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Date: Fri, 16 Apr 1993 15:17:02 -0400
From: Cliff Figallo
Subject: EFFector Online 5.06
To: eff-news@eff.org (eff-news mailing list)
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EFFector Online Volume 5 No. 6 4/16/1993 editors@eff.org
A Publication of the Electronic Frontier Foundation ISSN 1062-9424
...
April 16, 1993
INITIAL EFF ANALYSIS OF CLINTON PRIVACY AND SECURITY
PROPOSAL
The Clinton Administration today made a major announcement
on cryptography policy which will effect the privacy and security of
millions of Americans. The first part of the plan is to begin a
comprehensive inquiry into major communications privacy issues
such as export controls which have effectively denied most people
easy access to robust encryption as well as law enforcement issues
posed by new technology.
However, EFF is very concerned that the Administration has
already reached a conclusion on one critical part of the inquiry, before
any public comment or discussion has been allowed. Apparently, the
Administration is going to use its leverage to get all telephone
equipment vendors to adopt a voice encryption standard developed
by the National Security Agency. The so-called "Clipper Chip" is an
80-bit, split key escrowed encryption scheme which will be built into
chips manufactured by a military contractor. Two separate escrow
agents would store users' keys, and be required to turn them over
law enforcement upon presentation of a valid warrant. The
encryption scheme used is to be classified, but they chips will be
available to any manufacturer for incorporation into their
communications products.
This proposal raises a number of serious concerns .
First, the Administration appears to be adopting a solution
before conducting an inquiry. The NSA-developed Clipper chip may
not be the most secure product. Other vendors or developers may
have better schemes. Furthermore, we should not rely on the
government as the sole source for Clipper or any other chips. Rather,
independent chip manufacturers should be able to produce chipsets
based on open standards.
Second, an algorithm can not be trusted unless it can be tested.
Yet the Administration proposes to keep the chip algorithm
classified. EFF believes that any standard adopted ought to be public
and open. The public will only have confidence in the security of a
standard that is open to independent, expert scrutiny.
Third, while the use of the split-key, dual-escrowed
system may prove to be a reasonable balance between privacy and
law enforcement needs, the details of this scheme must be explored
publicly before it is adopted. What will give people confidence in the
safety of their keys? Does disclosure of keys to a third party waive
individual's fifth amendment rights in subsequent criminal
inquiries?
In sum, the Administration has shown great sensitivity to the
importance of these issues by planning a comprehensive inquiry into
digital privacy and security. However, the "Clipper chip" solution
ought to be considered as part of the inquiry, not be adopted before
the discussion even begins.
DETAILS OF THE PROPOSAL:
ESCROW
The 80-bit key will be divided between two escrow agents, each of
whom hold 40 bits of each key. Upon presentation of a valid
warrant, the two escrow agents would have to turn the key parts
over to law enforcement agents. Most likely the Attorney General
will be asked to identify appropriate escrow agents. Some in the
Administration have suggested one non-law enforcement federal
agency, perhaps the Federal Reserve, and one non-governmental
organization. But, there is no agreement on the identity of the agents
yet.
Key registration would be done by the manufacturer of the
communications device. A key is tied to the device, not to the person
using it.
CLASSIFIED ALGORITHM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF BACK DOORS
The Administration claims that there are no back door means by
which the government or others could break the code without
securing keys from the escrow agents and that the President will
be told there are no back doors to this classified algorithm. In order
to prove this, Administration sources are interested in arranging for
an all-star crypto cracker team to come in, under a security
arrangement, and examine the algorithm for trap doors. The results
of the investigation would then be made public.
GOVERNMENT AS MARKET DRIVER
In order to get a market moving, and to show that the government
believes in the security of this system, the feds will be the first big
customers for this product. Users will include the FBI, Secret Service,
VP Al Gore, and maybe even the President.
FROM MORE INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jerry Berman, Executive Director
Daniel J. Weitzner, Senior Staff Counsel
...
=============================================================
EFFector Online is published by
The Electronic Frontier Foundation
666 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC 20003
Phone: +1 202 544-9237 FAX: +1 202 547 5481
Internet Address: eff@eff.org
Coordination, production and shipping by Cliff Figallo, EFF
Online Communications Coordinator (fig@eff.org)
Reproduction of this publication in electronic media is encouraged.
Signed articles do not necessarily represent the view of the EFF.
To reproduce signed articles individually, please contact the authors
for their express permission.
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------- End of Forwarded Message
--
Joseph Truitt * BioCAD Corporation * joseph@biocad.com * voice 415/903-3923
fax 415/961-0584 * "The hardest thing in the world to understand is the
income tax." --Albert Einstein
