Well, now it's time to start developing the kinds of tools discussed on Cypherpunks back a few years ago: Using one key yields one set of data (ie, the dummy data) and using the real key yields the true data. Of course, there needs to be a way to hide the data such that one can't tell if there's another key. And now I'm thinking that data should start being stored on the other side of a Tor network or other similar wall: A key extracts data from one source but the real data is somewhere else entirely. In any event, there is no encrypted data for interrogators to see prior to receiving what the interrogated gives them, and no way for them to know if that's the 'real' data. This sounds like you don't even need to do much for this to be true. -TD> Date: Sat, 6 Oct 2007 18:41:34 -0400> To: clips@philodox.com; cypherpunks@al-qaeda.net> From: rah@shipwright.com> Subject: "Tell me about this new decryption law..."> > <http://www.userfriendly.org/cartoons/archives/07oct/uf010806.gif>> > [cid:p062408bac32dbf59feec@[68.167.57.91].1.0]> > --> > -----------------> R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah@ibuc.com>> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA> "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,> [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to> experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'> > [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/octet-stream which had a name of uf010806.gif] _________________________________________________________________ Climb to the top of the charts! Play Star Shuffle: the word scramble challenge with star power. http://club.live.com/star_shuffle.aspx?icid=starshuffle_wlmailtextlink_oct