kipp@mcom.com:
Is [SSL] insecure? If so, how?
Is there some cipher techonology that it absolutely must support? If so, which one? why?
While I'm not going to say anything about SSL's qualities as a secure transport layer as such (I've not looked at it carefully enough) I think that the criticisms are on larger issues. 1. Standards - the reinventing the wheel criticism; if other methods for more or less the same thing exist (and swIPe source has been around for all to test to their hearts' content) why try a new one? This point seems to have mutated into general criticism of NCom's attitude to / knowledge of IETF proceedings and the technology 2. Security - the basic insecurity of _any_ transport layer. "If Netscape had to come up with a new secure protocol, why did they choose the transport layer?" The transport layer is insecure because: it is less under the control of a user, it happens 'automagically'; it is at a lower level and so generally implemented by central authorities - sysadmins etc, and does not suit the web of trust model (nor does X.509) which is much better outside dictatorships; it is provided by the telco or net service provider who, as I suggested earlier, are prone to arm-twisting by the authorities, whether by legislation, or while 'cooperating'. Transport layer security does not provide data authentication, it only provides server authentication; nor does it provide data security and privacy between users, it only provides network security. To rebut Kipp's favourite justification, insecure transmission of passwords: transport layer security does _not_ improve password security/privacy, but only ensures that once a plaintext password is received by the transport layer, usually at a service provider, then it will not be intercepted. Secure transmission of passwords could (but as far as I know is not widely) be implemented at the client level, through DH handshaking or something, which would ensure a completely secure and _private_ transaction. Transport layer security is nice because it is conveniently automatic and transparent, but it can lead to a false sense of security for precisely that reason. Of course these are quintessentially Cypherpunk objections. A bank, or Singapore, would be quite comfortable with such a system for internal networks. "We know everything about you that we need to know" - Coleta Brueck, IRS ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "In between the breaths is rishab@dxm.ernet.in the space where we live" rishab@arbornet.org - Lawrence Durrell Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA