I'd like the Palladium/TCPA critics to offer an alternative proposal for achieving the following technical goal: Allow computers separated on the internet to cooperate and share data and computations such that no one can get access to the data outside the limitations and rules imposed by the applications. In other words, allow a distributed network application to create a "closed world" where it has control over the data and no one can get the application to "cheat". IMO this is clearly the real goal of TCPA and Palladium, in technical terms, when stripped of all the emotional rhetoric. As I posted previously, this concept works especially well for open source applications. You could even have each participant compile the program himself, but still each app can recognize the others on the network and cooperate with them. And this way all the participants can know that the applications aren't doing anything different than what they claim. This would be a very powerful capability with many uses that you might find both good and bad. I posted a long message earlier with three examples of privacy-oriented applications: secure game playing, anonymous P2P networking, and untraceable digital cash. In addition it can be used for DRM, restricting access to sensitive business or government data, and similar applications. For those of you who claim that such a technology is not necessarily objectionable in itself, but that the implementations in TCPA and Palladium are flawed, please explain how you could do it better. How can you maximize user control and privacy and minimize the potential for government or corporate takeovers? In other words, what *exactly* is wrong with the way that TCPA and Palladium choose to do things? Can you fix those problems and still achieve the basic goal, above?