I'll leave it to someone else to post the entire article, but the gist is that Gore sent a letter to Maria Cantwell saying that the administration is willing to consider alternatives to Clipper that are based upon nonclassified algrithms, [...]
There are three of ways they could proceed from here. The first is to declassify SKIPJACK, which would (IMO anyway) be another welcome boost for civilian crypto, in that it would be the chance to see and analyse a NSA-designed cryptosystem. For that very reason, I doubt that they will do it. (Small aside from another field: it will be _very_ interesting to compare the old SHA to the revised version. One of the reasons I suspect that the problem is quite significant is simply because they have decided to revise it and run the risk of invoking comparitive research which may disclose design techniques or methods of attack. If the later option is the lesser of two evils, I would guess that it is a nasty hole indeed.) The second would be to take an existing commercial cipher, and to sanctify that as their recommended algorithm. Again, assuming that they selected a properly secure algorithm, the very features of the algorithm they chose would be another point of interest. This is the least favorable option. Their final option would be to release another cipher, but with a reduced keysize or key entropy. Not the best solution, but one which I have a nasty suspicion will happen. Ian.