On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 11:08:11PM -0800, coderman wrote:
enjoy those pubkeys while you can suckers!
You're confusing hype with the real thing. Show me a 64 qubit register in solid state at ~room temperature, and then we'll talk about how that is relevant to elliptical curve crypto. Of course NSA is pimping ECC, so they might have their own reasons.
(i'm waiting for someone to suggest 32KBit key sizes. how much RAM does that eat?)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_cryptography Key sizes Since all the fastest known algorithms that allow to solve the ECDLP (baby-step giant-step, Pollard's rho, etc.), need O(\sqrt{n}) steps, it follows that the size of the underlying field shall be roughly twice the security parameter. For example, for 128-bit security one needs a curve over \mathbb{F}_q, where q \approx 2^{256}. This can be contrasted with finite-field cryptography (e.g., DSA) which requires[11] 3072-bit public keys and 256-bit private keys, and integer factorization cryptography (e.g., RSA) which requires 3072-bit public and private keys. The hardest ECC scheme (publicly) broken to date has 109-bit key (that is about 55 bits of security), it was broken near the beginning of 2003 using over 10,000 Pentium class PCs running continuously for over 540 days (see [12]). -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]