* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS Uu> 1) Chop off anything that even looks signature-like, whether the Uu> user intended it or not -- I consider this ugly, evil, and Uu> unreliable, and likely to chop stuff I want kept and leave stuff I'd Uu> like chopped. Yes, this seems fraught with problems. Uu> A "Dont-Mess-With-Trailers:" header line would help a bit. I agree. Uu> I don't know how much of Uu> M. Uu> ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 Uu> -- Uu> M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201 Uu> INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG Uu> was added by the author, how much by the Blue Wave and/or Uu> 8:914/201, or even for certain whether M. Stirner is the author or Uu> merely a machine owner; I'm guessing the author, and I'm guessing Uu> everything but the initial "M." was added automagically under the Uu> machine-owner's control. The BlueWave blurb was added by the program & can be stripped by re-editing the message before upload. Everything else is out of my control completely & added automagically by the host or the UUCP gateway. The sucker stays, no matter what I do. Some anonymity! Uu> 2) Cut-Here: lines of various sorts, either following a pre-specified Uu> syntax or a MIME-like flexible syntax. I like this approach, since Uu> it gives the user a reasonable level of control and very seldom Uu> guesses wrong, but there are so many standards to choose from, and a Uu> proper implementation would have to leave in the line (or add an Uu> equivalent) at each hop to avoid accretion of path-traces, and make Uu> sure it gets the correct syntax for each following remailer. And Uu> the user does have to explicitly request it, which some people Uu> view as a problem, especially if they don't know the characteristics Uu> of the later mail-handlers in the chain. I, personally, could live with it just to get the remailers to be truly anonymous. The rest of the user input is not especially easy anyway, particularly if accessing internet via a gateway. Another line wouldn't kill me. Uu> 3) Encryption-based systems, which only retain the encrypted portion; Uu> this means the user has to know more about the remailers being Uu> used, and there has to be a standard for expressing which remailers Uu> to forward to if more than one will be used (which it probably will Uu> be, for anybody security-aware enough to really want an encrypting Uu> remailer.) As an interrim measure I guess this is what I'll have to do, but as an early PGP partisan, I've had enough PGP experience not to be turned off by the extra trouble. Most casual users would be. In any case, I think that this is undoubtedly the most user-labor-intensive solution. Uu> Solving the problem for message headers is tougher than solving it Uu> for trailers. In that case, let's have this solved by Monday. 8-) ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner@f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via RBBS-NET node 8:914/201 INTERNET: M..Stirner@f28.n125.z1.RBBS-NET.ORG