Okay, I am starting to think that my description was not entirely perfect. It was reworked on the phone late last night by a copy editor who didn't understand the original wording (but I'm not trying to assign blame, since she read me her edited version back on the phone and I probably should have objected). I'll spend more time on this section in my next piece. On Thu, Jun 14, 2001 at 12:30:34PM -0700, Eric Cordian wrote:
If I follow Declan's argument, should I wish the bank to sign a note for $1, I send the bank 100 such notes each encrypted with a different key.
The bank then requests the decryption key for 99 of them, and after verifying that they are in fact $1 notes, has only a 1/100 chance that I've slipped a $1,000,000 note into the pile and they've missed it.
So in the DeclanCash system, every 100th dishonest transaction can rip the bank off for $999,999, an average loss for the bank of approximately $10k per dishonest transaction attempted
Or the bank could require 999,999 transactions and prosecute for fraud if they're getting hoodwinked. Or, as you say, limit the denomination. -Declan