If you compare the digital interceptor, to the voice interceptor, fairly, you will see they are in equally strong positions. When I am phoneing a person I know, I am automatically checking the `signature' of their voice. The other party on the line might be able to convince me they have a cold, but I hope I will have enough wisdom to postpone discussing the March 15th assassination plot untill the cold clears up. So we should compare a voice interceptor on a channel where the two people don't know each other's voice to the unsigned digital interceptor. In this case, the interceptor can claim to one party to be the other party, and remain undetected. This is the Diffe-Helman weakness. Alternatively we should compare the voice interceptor on a channel where the two people do know each other's voice to the signed digital interceptor. In this case, the interceptor will either be detected should some minimal authentication and verification be tried, or the interceptor will be unable to even listen in. The weakness remains here, but it has been patched over with authentication, and signed verification of the channel key. This is the Diffe-Helman weakness weakness. The (potential) interceptor is the reason why we must be so very carefull when validating other people's public keys. I know there is no interceptor between me and the people who's keys I sign. If I can be sure of no interceptors between one of them, and the person I wish to speak to, then I will be able to establish a secure channel. BTW props (respect, and thanks) to Diffe for his work creating this fascinating field of mathematics and cryptography. j' -- O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp@markv.com 1250 bit key fingerprint = B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5 89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F 524 bit key fingerprint = 8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED 66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48 Public keys by `finger jpp @hermix.markv.com' or pgp-public-keys@pgp.mit.edu Your feedback is welcome, directly or via symbol JPP on hex@sea.east.sun.com