I wrote:
Given existing crypto tools (PGP, etc), what are the top ten practical attacks against the privacy of stored data and electronic mail? Who are the bad guys? What tools do we need to limit these threats?
I'll post my own thoughts later.
Matt's Top Ten Underappreciated Threats to Privacy on the Internet ================================================================== 1. The sorry state of software. Everyone knows that nobody knows how to write software. Modern systems give hundreds of thousands of lines of code the chance to violate security policy. How can we be sure that the software we trust does the right thing? How can we reduce the opportunities for problems? 2. Ineffective protection against denial of service attacks. While not a direct threat to privacy, the ease with which almost anyone can mount effective denial of service attacks threatens the ability to deploy anonymous services. You'll note that no one worries very much about the millions of anonymous entry points to more robust networks like the telephone system or the postal service, where it's relatively hard (and expensive) for an individual to cause large-scale service disruption. How can we make the 'net robust enough to withstand mailbombs and newsgroup spamming? 3. Poor secret storage on networked computers. Cryptosystems allow you to manage large secrets by protecting smaller ones (keys). Unfortunately, modern computers are awful at protecting even the smallest secrets. Multi-user networked workstations can be broken into and their memories compromised. Standalone, single-user machines can be stolen or compromised through viruses that leak secrets asynchronously. What are the right mechanisms for storing and managing keys on various platforms? Remote servers, where there may be no user available to enter a passphrase (but see threat #5, below), are an especially hard problem. 4. Poorly understood random number generation techniques. Keys and session variables need good sources of unpredictable bits. Currently used techniques (like event inter-arrival times) are only marginally well understood and depend to a great deal on low-level characteristics of the platforms on which they are run. We need a wider range of techniques (especially ones that work without relying on user input), and to better understand their risks and failure modes. Some interesting ideas have been proposed that deserve further study. At CRYPTO '94 there was an interesting paper on using disk airflow variation to get random bits. Another interesting technique, first proposed by Don Mitchell, involves exploiting clock skew. Here's a C program that seems to produce one pretty random bit per second on most platforms. How good are the bits? Can we get more bandwidth out of it? #include <stdio.h> #include <signal.h> int count=0; void printbit() { signal(SIGALRM,printbit); alarm(1); printf("%1d",count&01); fflush(stdout); } main() { signal(SIGALRM,printbit); alarm(1); while (1) count++; } 5. Weak passphrases. Most crypto software addresses the key storage and key generation problems by relying on user-generated passphrase strings, which are presumed to contain enough entropy to produce good key material and are also easy enough to remember that they do not require secure storage. While dictionary attacks are a well known problem with short passwords, much less is known about lines of attack against user- selected passphrase-based keys. Shannon tells us that English text has just over 1 bit of entropy per character, which would seem to leave most passphrases well within reach of brute-force search. Less is known, however, about good techniques for enumerating passphrases in order to exploit low entropy. Until we have a better understanding of how to attack passphrases, we really have no idea how weak or strong they are. 6. Limited support for remote trusted agents. Almost all currently available cryptographic software assumes that the user is in direct control over the systems on which they run and has a secure path to it. For example, the interfaces to programs like PGP and CFS assume that their input is comes from the user over a secure path like the local console. This is not always the case, of course; consider the problem of reading your mail remotely when logged in over the Internet. We need better mechanisms for transferring the trusted operations to the local trusted machine while keeping the logical operations (like where the mail is) where they logically belong. 7. Poorly understood protocol and service interactions. Features frequently come back to bite us, and its hard to know even where to look. The Internet worm was propagated via an obscure and innocent-looking feature in sendmail; how many more features in how many more programs have unexpected consequences just waiting to be discovered? Is the conventional wisdom of hiding behind firewalls and turning off services really the only answer? 8. Lack of scalable security infrastructure. No comment... 9. Poorly understood "out of band" attack risks. Security people tend to focus on what's easy to model. Unfortunately, attackers focus on what's easy to exploit. We need a better understanding of just how easy some non-traditional attacks are. Most of the answers are probably too scary to think about. How long do our keys need to be in the face of electromagnetic radiation, physical monitoring, Trojan horses, social engineering, and so on and so on? 10. No broad-based demand for security. This is a well-known problem among almost everyone who has tied his or her fortune to selling security products and services. Until there is widespread demand for transparent security, the tools and infrastructure needed to support it will be expensive and inaccessible to many applications. This is partly a problem of understanding the threats and risks in real applications, and of building systems that include security as a basic feature rather than as a later "add on". There's a lot missing from this list, and a lot you can disagree with among the things that are on it. Flame away... -matt