Hellman's Hints --------------- [Hellman]
When a message is to be sent it will first be encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing
E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK}
When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K
Just a quibble, Mr. Hellman says earlier that K1 and K2 lead to unit key UK, not family code K. And given the above, how do they ever decrypt the message if they don't have K, unless the scheme is insecure under the `family code'? (>barf<, leave it for the Ministry of Truth to come up with some user-friendly term for something inherently nauseating like `friendly fire', I wonder if Dingaling is behind this one too...) Do you get it? -------------- This little formula is not obvious to me. It seems to me two basic questions have to be answered, could someone spell these out given what's known? 1. How the phones interact prior/during a call 2. How the sinister TLAs wiretap 3. How casual eavesdropping by other than billion-dollary agencies is prevented (if at all) The Flimsy Code --------------- The family code is clearly a propaganda wrench in the works. `They' now have some pretty powerful ammunition--it must be secure if you get to change your code whenever you want, right? It's so simple anyone can use it! I'm a bit surprised it wasn't mentioned in the announcement. I guess all the hoopla and slick and vapid AT&T ads about `wow, you get to *choose* your combination!' will come a bit later, it'll fit in quite nicely with their `I' plan, as in Illegal... (I hope Sprint and MCI sue the pants off AT&T and the government for this outrageous collusion, unless of course they are in the collusion too...) Conspiracy Theories ------------------- how is it that CPSR and EFF came out with responses to the initial announcement virtually instantaneously after its release? Are they just really swift? I want to know what >every< single person on those mailing lists has to say about how their name got there and how long they knew about this abomination (and before they have a chance to agree on stories!). I don't appreciate Mr. Banisar's little slash suggesting that the issue is already closed and that anyone who thinks something just a tad unusual is going on is a deranged conspiracy monger... I think its kind of cute how he says that `nothing significant' appeared in the traffic... Who Has the Keys? ----------------- The evasion of `who stores the keys' makes me wonder. It suggests that the proposal was poorly crafted (which is true in any case), but, more likely, IMHO, the scheme is weak enough for the NSA (but maybe not cops) to break regardless, and hence their casual disregard for this seemingly monumentally crucial point. Also, they can make it sound like they are `compromising' by giving the appearance of public debate on the agencies, because it won't really matter, while diverting attention from the *real* issues (look here! see your rights? now you see 'em, now you don't... pick a key, any key---was it this one? >wow< how'd you *do* that?). What IS Acceptable ------------------ We should be prepared to say what >is< acceptable for the government to do; don't get caught off guard with a question like ``well, what are you people proposing as an alternative?'' Here are a few ideas... 1) Get the hell out of the cryptography and hardware development business, and leave private industry alone to do what it does best when not harrassed by extortionists and terrorists who shall remain nameless but have the initials N.S.A. ... 2) Let the NIST pick a phone encryption scheme after totally open debates and total noninvolvement by the NSA, who is obviously biased. We can note that this has been attempted to be followed for other encryption schemes (e.g. digital signature, DES, etc.) why not here? what's so special? 3) Let communications companies loose on it, stay out of the way or get trampled by the stampede, and we'll all be happy. Ministry of Truth (1993-?) -------------------------- Finally, drive home the point: the government may have always had the `precedent' (don't ever use `right' here) to *listen*, there has never been any assurance that they must *understand* what is being said, and we are assured by our Noble Constitution that we can say what we please, and if by exercising this fundamental and inalienable right we upset the fragile status quo, then so be it, because the monument of freedom of speech will always overshadow the weak and tenuous `precedent to listen'. Cryptography simply alters their *understanding* of what is on a line from the meaningful to the meaningless, and only the Ministry of Truth is allowed to regulate *meaning* (hm, maybe that will be the next government agency created under the New Regime...) Mea Culpa --------- sorry for the rough editing on the last message, that's what happens in the heat of the moment from one of those impatient and extremely agitated cypherpunks... For those of you keeping score at home, the ``Notice how the proposal talks about'' non sequitur should read ``Notice how the proposal talks about criminals and terrorists without any qualifications such as `alleged' and `suspected' ''. as my penance you have this little beauty in front of you... How Does Cypherpunk Sound? -------------------------- `cypherpunk' actually has some pretty endearing qualities as a name, and I'd be a bit horrified to give it up, just when I was waiting for the T shirt ``Cypherpunks do it stealthily'' (secretly? sneakily?). The public seems to have a bit of fascination for `cyberpunk' right now and we are just riding on it (stealthily? secretly? sneakily?). OK, so we don't publicize that term, but it could actually increase the glamor and mystery of the cause; we shouldn't pretend that we're not seriously pissed off... Quote Corner ------------ ``the TURNCOATS ARE COMING!'' ``REMEMBER THE LIBERTY!'' ``They're HEEEERE...'' ``Keys? I thought YOU had the keys! Do you have a crypt hanger? We better call the cryptsmith...''