-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I wrote: # I suppose that a site that escapes detection as a Mixmaster will throw off # the correlation stats (i.e. because a message from that site to B won't be # identified as a remailed message). But such sites are elusive objects I # think. On the one hand, the site can't endure for long, or else its # throughput traffic will likely give it away as an anonymizer (i.e. it gets # lots of mail from the Mix network, and sends out similar amounts of mail to # all sorts of people and the network). On the other hand, it had better last, # or else it will look suspicious as a transient account receiving mail from # the Mix network, sending a few messages, and quickly vanishing. Lance writes:
The second paragraph seems to deal with the issue of being known as an anonymous remailer or regular remailer user. I am not sure exactly what the concern with that is.
I was trying to explore possible ways to beat TA with less bandwidth, in the context of transient (w.r.t. network address) anonymizers. I indicated doubt about the possibility of any real gain, and as I think about it more I'm not able to convince myself that there's any real value at all in that regard. Futplex <futplex@pseudonym.com> - "IBM ?" Go Colts ! - "All the girls are doing it" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMPBbEynaAKQPVHDZAQGm7wf+LbaZeZqI8/qwBQi+6vS4bzvtSkdf9i1v aD8I0jlNLAmFsPQ6dJ0mOBObPz8b+3PbJ1/TCyr5w0vWcb6XpEemblqNf1H+SdY+ nP6Xbmdoyie2cObGjYOz8HHvhg+qANnanIqtax/CPd9smPMcLnl20pyLJPhlFRPG MUQX33yIrxXEGY0os725Q1lQDWHaMpbt65+quzVZYFAfaNzBzQ99vy4ZrzsBPZIK GLiqPcygWt3Kxfk7O0WjI2Gic3nrrpP1X5SxWwFnGQmlm9Zd9FwJxhpLsW4s+0B0 CNAI8c1ASA9AebLVVYVP4riQRkVDK/BYYSJLcXQfp2TzDSgPXg32JQ== =coNU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----