In article <+cmu.andrew.internet.cypherpunks+UlYwNe:00UfAM107VG@andrew.cmu.edu> EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU writes:
The different paths going through those different signatures will be correlated/non-independent, yes.... but that isn't the problem unless you're considering multiple paths (in a more complicated version).
To determine key validity, you do have to consider all paths. If a single trusted path to the bad key exists, the attacker wins.
IIRC, there have been some sociological studies showing that _everyone_ is linked through 6 or so people.
Milgram's "small world" experiments used a much looser sort of "link" than we want here. It would be certainly interesting to know how large a difference this makes.
Now, there's the question of whether you _need_ to be linked to everyone - [...] I see nothing wrong (and am in favor of) separation of the elite from the masses.
Gee, let me guess which group you're in... I'll go with "people I want to talk to" versus "people I don't want to talk to", thanks. It's true that you don't need to talk to everybody. The problem is that I might want to talk to people whom I don't know personally, but know by reputation, or by function ("DEA Rat Hotline" -- well, maybe not). -- . Eli Brandt usual disclaimers . . eli+@cs.cmu.edu PGP key on request . . violation of 18 U.S.C. 1462: "fuck".