I appologise to the list for the character mangling in the original posting. I wrote it in Word so I could spellcheck it, and I couldn't turn OFF the idiotic smartquotes. I've placed a cleaned up, fewer typo, and hyperlinked version out on my NIST page, http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell/nist/pdf.nist2.html jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com> writes:
Geoff said that they may want legislation support for protecting against illegal release of keys, failure to release, etc.
Pardon me, but since this "key escrow" system was always claimed to be "voluntary," then how can there be any kind of legal penalties associated with "failure to release" those keys?
It was Geoff G. talking, not Mike Nelson or Ed Appel. The difference is critical. Mike and Ed have some political savvy. My best friend Geoff does not. I believe that Geoff has never bought into "voluntary" as a concept. EPIC successfully FOIA'd papers from the FBI saying that they will change their tune when/if there isn't sufficient compliance. Mike and Ed are political enough to know that they can't sell this if they push too hard. Geoff isn't. The podium had a light that showed green/yellow/red lights. These let the speakers know how much time was left. For the morning, since only NIST/NSA/FBI/... folks talked, they didn't bother to reset the light. It was red all the time, altho it blinked occasionally. Ed took the mike, and asked "what is the red light for? Does it glow red whenever someone from the Government is lying?" It got a good chuckle. It was probably also close to being true. Ed and Mike understand the audience, Geoff never will.
Which raises another question: Let's suppose I owned a product based on CKE, and I went to the escrow agent and said, "This escrow is voluntary, right? If so, erase my key in your possession."
Not that I'd trust them to do so, but how "voluntary" can a system be if people can't volunteer out of it?
It isn't voluntary for export approved software. The word voluntary is not in the criteria. It is only voluntary if domestic users foolishly choose to buy GAK'd products. So don't! Criteria #2 says "...cryptographic functions shall be inoperable until the key(s) is escrowed in accordance with #3." Worse, IMHO, is criteria #9, which states " ... cryptographic functions shall interoperate only with key escrow cryptographic functions in products that meet these criteria..." The interoperability issues stayed muddy. The government didn't spend much effort making it clearer. The karma seemed to be that if you had two products, say Webscape 128 and Webscape 64/Gak, selling 128 domestically and 64/GAK exported, that you can't make Webscape128 interoperate with 64/GAK unless the Webscape128 keys are GAKed. Part of this is burried in agent criteria #6, "6. Escrow agent entities that are certified by the U.S. government shall work with developers of key escrow encryption products to develop and support a feature that allows the product to verify to one another that the product's keys have been escrowed with a U.S.-certified agent." Looks to me like the software has to chase up the chain of certification authorities (or escrow authorities if you prefer) before it can work. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>