Given that the U.S. and E.U. governments seem to be moving toward a policy of key escrow/recovery, 7Pillars Partners is starting a team effort to demonstrate the practical problems in implementing such a system. The plan is to have the team block out the probable design of the infrastructure, with as many of the options available outlined and discussed (e.g., 'escrow' itself--will a copy of the secret key need to be sent to the escrow agent, will it be created by the agent and assigned to the device, will the method be the use of two receiver keys (one packet to the intended party, one to the escrow agent), will the method be to implement a 'back door' into the cryptosystem itself), and then a thorough expansion on all possible methods of attack on the various elements of the infrastructure (denial, flooding, espionage, etc.). The intent of this project is two-fold: it will provide a practical guide that I hope will demonstrate that any key escrow/recovery system and infrastructure, no matter how secure/safe, will fall to attack; if such a system does end up being implemented and come into operation, the analysis will serve as a first-approximation guide for resistance. We could use a solid outside cryptographer, as well as an attorney to work through the probable legal elements involved in the system. Interest in being on the team should be indicated to: Michael Wilson, 5514706@mcimail.com or partners@7pillars.com MW http://www.7pillars.com/