On 7 Aug 2001, at 14:48, Steve Schear wrote:
At a workshop presentation last spring I suggested a non-regulatory way to include reduction in choice effects. Under the proposed changes Congress would set market size and penetration limits for all markets (based on SIC or its newer offspring) exceeding some minimum size threshold (e.g., 0.1% GNP) and enabling competitors to sue in federal court for removal of trademarks and copyrights of the monopolist related to the industry in question. Since trademarks and copyrights are privileges and not rights they can, theoretically, be rescinded.
So under this "no fault antitrust" proposal, we strip away the illusion that the DOJ is punishing predatory behavior and accept that, in fact, what is being punished is market share dominance? Interesting notion, here's why I don't think this will work: the single difficult point in most of these antitrust cases is determining what constitutes the market in question in the first place. For example, in the Microsoft case, Microsoft was held to have a monoploly on operating systems for computers which use intel processors. Obviously, there is no such market in the first place. There's a server market (in which sun competes), there's a personal computer market (in which Apple competes), but there's no fucking such thing as the Intel (or compatible) powered computer market, it's as absurd a concept as the spaghetti sauce with Paul Newman's picture on the jar market.
Under this new regimen companies would be inclined to self-police rather than risk legal proceedings from their competitors. By setting legal market share limits and placing the initiative in the hands of competitors rather than the DOJ it is hoped to remove much of the political involvement in antitrust.
steve
The other possible advantage of allegedly punishing companies for actually engaging in unethical actions rather than merely for getting too large a market share is the (admittedly unlikely) psossibility that in some cases the claims might be true. For example, consider a hypothetical case in which, due to economies of scale or whatever, that there really only ought to be one supplier of a given product. Would forcing that company to raise its prices until its market share falls to approved levels really be to anyone's benefit? George