On Thu, Aug 30, 2001 at 10:02:54AM -0700, Tim May wrote: | Alas, the marketing of such "dissident-grade untraceability" is | difficult. Partly because anything that is dissident-grade is also | pedophile-grade, money launderer-grade, freedom fighter-grade, | terrorist-grade, etc. I think a larger problem is that we don't know how to build it. Once we build it, we may be able to market it. But when you look at building something for dissidents, you realize that you have very high stealth requirements, since using such software is likely to subject its users to rubber-hose, and harsher forms of attack. Productizing stealth systems is hard; the adversaries can take them apart and find discriminators. Not productizing stealth systems is risky; your custom systems are likely to be of different strengths, and the weak ones will provide your adversaries with training on how to attack the hard ones, as well as insight into how you're producing them. (See for example, Enigma, increasing rotors; One-time-pad, Soviet typewriters; British bingo cages.) Also worth reading is "Traffic Analysis Attacks and Trade-Offs in Anonymity Providing Systems" by Back, Muller and Stiglic, at http://crypto.cs.mcgill.ca/~stiglic/publications.html Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume