I would like to add an extension to my proposal for split message anonymous remailing schemes. The current proposal counts on the good will of the senders to split their messages into random pieces. If a remailer operator receives non-random text I can think of at least three options for what to do: 1) The operator can drop the message. 2) The remailer operator can split the message him or herself and send the pieces through new remailer chains. 3) Suppose there is a computer named Moe that lives on the internet, is hidden behind a nym, and splits messages and enters the pieces into remailer chains. The remailer can then encrypt the non-random text along with a "please forward to" command to Moe, and send the ciphertext anonymously to Moe. (Due to the encryption there is no need to split this message.) The risk, in ascending terms of legal danger, for the operator would be 1), 3), and 2). Nevertheless, all three alternatives should be safe within a secure (in the sense of Chaum, 1981) remailer network. Leonard