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Date: Wed, 15 Feb 2006 13:36:26 -0500
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From: "R. A. Hettinga"
Subject: [Clips] A New Surveillance Act
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http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB113996743590074183.html
The Wall Street Journal
February 15, 2006
COMMENTARY
DOW JONES REPRINTS
A New Surveillance Act
By RICHARD A. POSNER
February 15, 2006; Page A16
The best, and probably the only, way to end the debate over the propriety
of the National Security Agency's conducting electronic surveillance
outside the framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is for
Congress to enact a new statute.
The administration is right to point out that FISA, enacted in 1978 -- long
before the danger of global terrorism was recognized and electronic
surveillance was transformed by the digital revolution -- is dangerously
obsolete. It retains value as a framework for monitoring the communications
of known terrorists, but it is hopeless as a framework for detecting
terrorists. It requires that surveillance be conducted pursuant to warrants
based on probable cause to believe that the target of surveillance is a
terrorist, when the desperate need is to find out who is a terrorist.
Critics of the NSA's program point out that surveillance not cabined by a
probable-cause requirement produces many false positives (intercepts that
prove upon investigation to have no intelligence value). That is not a
sound criticism.
National security intelligence is a search for the needle in a haystack.
The intelligence services must cast a wide net with a fine mesh to catch
the clues that may enable the next attack to be prevented. The initial
trolling for clues is done by computer search programs, which do not invade
privacy because search programs are not sentient beings. The programs pick
out a tiny percentage of communications to be read by (human) intelligence
officers, and a small subset of these will turn out to have intelligence
value and spur an investigation. Some of these may be communications to
which a U.S. citizen is a party.
The program is vital, given the terrorist menace, which is real and not
abating. It may be thanks to such programs, as well as to other
counterterrorist operations, that we have been spared a repetition of 9/11.
We mustn't let our guard down, basking in the false assurance created by
the lapse of time since the last attack. But the legality of the program
has been called into question, and fears have been expressed about its
impact on civil liberties.
These concerns can be addressed without gutting the program. But not by
relaxing the standard for obtaining a warrant. Instead of requiring
probable cause to believe the target a terrorist, FISA could be amended to
require merely reasonable suspicion. But even that would be too
restrictive. And the lower the standard for getting a warrant, the less of
a filter a warrant requirement creates. If all that the government is
required to state in its application is that it thinks an interception
might yield intelligence information, judges will have no basis for
refusing to grant the application.
* * *
It is a mistake to think that the only way to prevent abuses of a
surveillance program is by requiring warrants. Congress could enact a
statute that would subject warrantless electronic surveillance to tight
oversight and specific legal controls, as follows:
1. Oversight: The new statute would --
(a) Create a steering committee for national security electronic
surveillance composed of the attorney general, the director of national
intelligence, the secretary of homeland security (chairman), and a senior
or retired federal judge or justice appointed by the chief justice of the
United States. The committee would monitor all such surveillance to assure
compliance with the Constitution and laws.
(b) Require the NSA to submit to the FISA court, every six months, a list
of the names and other identifying information of all persons whose
communications had been intercepted without a warrant in the previous six
months, with a brief statement of why these individuals had been targeted.
If the court concluded that an interception had been inappropriate, it
would so report to the steering committee and the congressional
intelligence committees.
2. Specific controls: The statute would --
(a) Authorize "national security electronic surveillance" outside FISA's
existing framework, provided that Congress declared a national emergency
and the president certified that such surveillance was necessary in the
national interest. Warrants would continue to be required for all physical
searches and for all electronic surveillance for which FISA's existing
probable-cause requirement could be satisfied.
(b) Define "national security" narrowly, excluding "ecoterrorism,"
animal-rights terrorism, and other forms of political violence that, though
criminal and deplorable, do not endanger the nation.
(c) Sunset after five years, or sooner if the declaration of national
emergency was rescinded.
(d) Forbid any use of intercepted information for any purpose other than
"national security" as defined in the statute (point b above). Thus the
information could not be used as evidence or leads in a prosecution for
ordinary crime. There would be heavy criminal penalties for violating this
provision, to allay concern that "wild talk" picked up by electronic
surveillance would lead to criminal investigations unrelated to national
security.
(e) Require responsible officials to certify to the FISA court annually
that there had been no violations of the statute during the preceding year.
False certification would be punishable as perjury.
(f) Bar lawsuits challenging the legality of the NSA's current warrantless
surveillance program. Such lawsuits would distract officials from their
important duties, to no purpose given the new statute.
Mr. Posner is a judge on the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and a
senior lecturer in law at the University of Chicago Law School.
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R. A. Hettinga
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
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--
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R. A. Hettinga
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'