On Fri, Oct 24, 1997 at 06:13:55AM -0700, mark@unicorn.com wrote:
whgiii@invweb.net wrote:
No their system does not. For what the FBI and NSA want much more needs to be done.
Really? Read the message I sent after that one. Let's suppose it's 2007, PGP have 99% of the crypto market. [...]
Probabilty: 0% Next argument:
Here's a quick example of how cool CMR is... let's suppose that loser@foo-bah.com upsets a customer and is working for a CMR corporation. Mr Irate Customer downloads some of that kiddie porn that we're told is all over the Net, and encrypts it to loser@foo-bah.com, but doesn't encrypt it to the company key. Mr Irate Customer mails hundreds of these images to loser@foo-bah.com. Their system bounces them. The security personnel at foo-bah.com notice all these bounces and snarf some of the messages.
The security personell take these messages to Mr Loser, and force him to decrypt them. Shock, horror, what a hideous, insane pervert Mr Loser must be to be receiving all these messages. Mr Loser is handed over to the cops and taken away. He might not go to jail, but he'll lose his job.
With a more rational implementation Mr Loser would receive the messages and see that they're obscene, and immediately report them to the security personnel who could track down the sender. But when the security personnel find them first, they immediately assume that Mr Loser asked for them.
Words fail me. This is completely idiotic. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent@songbird.com the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44 61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55 http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html