This sounds simple to implement by users and remailers, after all, cpunk messages with bad syntax -> /dev/null . Users can implement this quite easily, simply use the cpunk more than you actually need to. You are your best decoy. I muse about the idea of remailers that freely allow anybody to access the ques of the cpunk remailers with http and telnet. If people are using the remailers properly, and the destination is usenet, there's no loss to privacy. This can even be implemented with e-mail destinations, with no loss to privacy that isn't already lost simply by using the net itself. Should this idea be implemented with the cpunk remailers, it can actually prevent the seizure of the server by the authorities, considering how they couldn't get anything they couldn't have already gotten by simply telneting or httping in. There is the reported risk of the timing cryptanalysis attacks, so a que of messages can be made inaccessable while the actual {en|de}cryption is being done. I plan on doing these things when I can get the Linux/BSD system more figured out than I have. I'm primarily intersted in learning, so I plan on keeping an open system, other than the Mixmaster binaries and other stuff affected by ITAR.