Obfuscation writes:
Adam Back writes:
It's as strong as we could make it. Private interactive communications are a hard problem. As Wei and I were discussing in the "PipeNet protocol" thread in the last couple of weeks, there are 4 main properties you're trying to optimise over:
1. security (resistance to traffic analysis) 2. performance 3. bandwidth efficiency (cost) 4. DoS resistance
It appears pretty hard to get more than one of these properties with theoretical optimality. PipeNet gets the first one with good theoretical security, but none of the others are good. Freedom makes an engineering tradeoff which does reasonably on all 4.
What about adding link padding? Can you say something about why this doesn't help, or costs too much?
So the attack you described without link padding involves the attacker either: - eavesdropping on all links into and out of the network (untargetted attack) - or eavesdropping on a targetted or suspected user - and then eavesdropping on all exit nodes - or, on selected web sites you think the user visits - or trying to work backwards from an exit node or web site to a user - by eavesdropping on entry nodes If the attacker can observe those things, he can observe the effects of network congestion because freedom is not synchronous. (Making freedom synchronous would adversely affect performance and make it much more vulnerable to DoS.) The attacker therefore already has the necessary taps to match up congestion patterns between the client to first hop link and the exit node or web site request. If congestion is too noisy or uniform to discern anything, he can go create some selective congestion by ping flooding (or inducing more plausibly deniable types of congestion) on that link. And observe the effects. He can very easily hide the source of his congestion attempts by creating it using the freedom network. The attacker can also substitute the need for extensive network taps by measuring congestion inside the freedom network to narrow down where a user is coming from. Any unpriviledged user can measure congestion in real time using the freedom protocol by creating routes over all combinations of hops, pairs of hops and triples of hops. This may allow a user to work backwards from an exit node to an entry node with only one network tap. So the main cost increase for the attacker of link padding is the complexity of the analysis. But it doesn't add many bits. It would probably be easiest to do what the Onion Routing analysis used: plot some graphs of the timing data. You would probably be able to visually see the traffic analysis patterns. Automating the analysis would be a little harder due to the noise. Next the cost of link padding. Clearly it costs. ISPs use "bandwidth aggregation" figures to estimate their bandwidth requirements based on online users. This figure means what percentage of their modem bandwidth a user uses while online (not 56 kbits on a 56kbaud modem because the user pauses between downloads etc). This figure varies and changes over time. With a bandwidth aggregation factor of 6:1 it would cost 6 times as much bandwidth. On top of that you don't want to change bandwidth utilisation in response to demand or you leak information about routes opening and closing. So you need to have some surplus padding available for users to use as they open connections. So how does one fix it if link padding alone doesn't work? As I suggested doing this efficiently and practically is an open problem. PipeNet style synchronous works, or latency padding (which comes to the same thing), but as discussed earlier these have pretty severe performance implications. So the challenge is, to find a more efficient hybrid or alternate design which retains as much as possible PipeNet or DCNet security properties, but improves performance and reduces bandwidth costs, if such networks exists. Adam
Without it, someone monitoring your system can see which ZKS node you are talking to. If they then monitor that node they can see that whenever you send an incoming message, there comes an outgoing message, so they can see the next node you are talking to, and so on.
With link padding, they couldn't do this. They'd have to interrupt your data stream and then monitor *all* the outgoing traffic from *all* the ZKS nodes and see which one got interrupted. This sounds like a much more expensive attack. It is an active attack as well, while the previous one is passive and could be done by a Carnivore system.