On Tue, 3 Jul 2001, Tim May wrote:
There _might_ be a bunch of failed implant attempts, failed attempts to bring a fertilized egg to term. [...] But no particular "imminent danger" requiring police action to protect the safety of others.
This is of course just a part of a general tendency, the broadening of law to cover risk (e.g. mandatory seatbelts), indirect harm (e.g. the idea of currency transaction taxation to "stabilize" exchange rates), thought crime (e.g. hacking, copyright violation and the diaries-as-child-porn stuff), harm through inaction (e.g. not helping a suffocating person) and "injustice" (e.g. nondiscrimation statutes; my own views are in flux over this one). I.e., people increasingly consider law in terms of consequences, not actions. I can't see how this is a surprise to anyone on the list.
The real issue is about a move toward "permission requirements" for research.
And also the fact that people increasingly view such licencing as part of the government's legitimate sphere of influence, or even its responsibility. Somewhere along the line ordinary people seem to have lost the idea that by default everything is allowed, and have come to think that before one can do something, the state can, and so has to, guarantee that there are no unfortunate consequences (e.g. FDA requirements on new pharmaceuticals). Hence, regulation based on possibilities instead of outcomes.
The real issue, as readers of my stuff will know, is the creation and support of guilds: licensing is a rent-seeking mechanism.
One might extend that to people with at least some familiarity with libertarian theory.
How long before it carries over to other areas in biology?
I think something similar to this is already happening, only indirectly through patents on basic bioresearch tools. It isn't legislation, but the centralization sure makes state control a helluva lot easier, plus gives tonnes of legitimate sounding excuses for the King's men to go over your possessions.
Why not restrict computer virus research?
Hasn't it been, already? If I'm not mistaken, people already go to prison for writing viruses. Ditto for hacking tools, TPM circumvention software, and soon probably spamming tools as well.
Or nanotech research?
We'll have to wait for that until the critters do something useful, or the general public believes that is an imminent "threat".
-- the "ban on bomb-making instructions" proposed by the usual suspects is a variant on this issue.
Mm. I've always thought of this sort of thing as more of a spinoff of the conventional censorship discourse. Might be there is a difference, though, as Plain Old Censorship is usually advocated because the material itself is "harmful", while we now operate on the added spin of "stuff that enables you to do Bad Things". That's obviously a bit broader in that it covers just about all functional science/technology, even if the stuff per se does not incite the reader to *do* anything.
-- and as with "precursor chemicals," chemicals which _could_ be made into methamphetamines or Sarin or other banned items, there will be bans on "precursor knowledge."
The patent argument above ties nicely with this one.
It's the groundwork, the precursor knowledge, that the government is now cracking down on. A very disturbing trend.
I think the Rael crackdown is more a display of common irrationality than the kind of deviousness you attribute to it. "But we need to do *something* about it!"
-- fortunately, these "warning shots" will perhaps accelerate a transition into cypherspace.
Or, if you are right about the precursor knowledge bit, a fresh attack on crypto infrastructure. This time it would probably start by associating crypto with pedophiles -- lately national security seems to have lost its most corrosive appeal. Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy, mailto:decoy@iki.fi, gsm: +358-50-5756111 student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front