* Be careful with the wording of the legislation; be sure to specify *key-escrow* and not any other forms of cryptography.
This is extremely dangerous. Much of legislation is compromise. Any such bill is probably so close to a bill that outlaws cryptography (or could be interpreted as a precedent for such a bill)
The point Dean makes is important. You want a positive right for individuals to use cryptography in any form, not just a 'negative right' which restricts government from creating key registration requirements. Such a positive right will _a fortiori_ exclude key escrow systems, and that's what you want. You want to make sure that all _restrictions_ on cryptography are disallowed, that there are no _restricted_ forms of cryptography. The point is subtle, but profound. Both techniques get rid of key registration, but one is a restriction on cryptography and the other is not. There is another point to remember about constitutional democracies. That which the legislature may do, the legislature may also undo. The level at which the prohibition against cryptography restrictions is appropriate is at the constitutional level. A constitutional provision binds the government; lesser solutions are less effective, even when they should be sought out as intermediaries. At the first CFP conference, Lawrence Tribe made this point extremely well, that the fundamental right of citizens should be invariant to technology. Eric