At 10:29 AM 5/21/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote:
At 3:00 PM 5/21/96, Rev. Mark Grant, ULC wrote:
Yeah, but the attack model I was assuming was lawyers rather than intelligence agencies. The NSA could probably easily link the two together, but the Church of Foobar(tm) probably couldn't. They'd only have access to the logs on the ISP and the information you gave when you signed up, not the raw packets on the Net.
The traffic analysis on this fixed mapping system needs no access to packets and is childishly simple.
Let's call the first site "Alice" and the emanation site "Bob."
That is, all messages sent to the persistent site Alice appear to come from the site Bob.
The Church of Clams can simply send messages addressed to themselves through the Alice remailer and see immediately that they appear to come from Bob.
Tim, I think you missed his (and my) point. The purpose of such a split is not to disguise the link between Alice and Bob; the point is to prevent legal attacks on the remailer by putting the transmission part (Bob) in a country which is hard to reach. Logically, an attacker could easily determine that sending a message to Alice would have it come back from Bob, but the converse would not be true: A message which came from Bob would not necessarily have come from Alice. Besides, any legal attack would require a substantial investment that would make harassment suits pointless. Add to this the fact that "Bob" might only last a few weeks... An organization like COS would be faced with no good target. Jim Bell jimbell@pacifier.com