Tim May wrote:
I would have thought that a much more robust (against the attacks above) system would involve:
- nodes scattered amongst many countries, a la remailers
- no known publicized nexus (less bait for lawyers, prosecutors, etc.)
- changeable nodes, again, a la remailers
- smaller and cheaper nodes, rather than expensive workstation-class nodes
- CD-ROMS made of Eternity files and then sold or distributed widely
- purely cyberspatial locations, with no know nexus
(I point to my own "BlackNet" experiment as one approach.)
It may be that the architectures/strategies being considered by Ryan Lackey, Adam Back, and others are robust against the attacks described above.
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Comments?
There is one thing that comes to mind that was just a topic covered on this list and that is the use of cellular/wireless/RF/ham for connections to said machines. Obviously, this would make seizure more difficult (and perhaps increase the likelyhood of prior warning, if for example, cellular service was suddenly cut off). I am currently studying some parallels between the established FCC tolerance of ham radio self-regulation vis-a-vis anonymous remailers. I haven't yet drawn up my opinions, as they are still being formed. I think that this might be one avenue to look down as there is obviously a type of legal precident in what is allowed/tolerated under obvious FCC jursidiction, whereas the jurisdiction over IP is obviously still ambiguous. --David Miller middle rival devil rim lad Windows '95 -- a dirty, two-bit operating system.