Jon Callas <jon@pgp.com> writes:
In the course of all the discussion here, I have seen a number of implicit attitudes and assumptions that irritate me. This is a short rant to air my irritation.
[bucko big snip] Well, it was a nice rant, Jon. Most of it was even crypto-correct :-) But the problem is you didn't address the point causing your perceived hostilities. Not once. The point is Jon "GAK compliance meister" Callas, you're building in GAK compliance. Now we know that it is possible for you to have GAK compliance without using it for that purpose, or at least to promise that at this stage, promise sincerely even, it doesn't make any difference. When mandatory GAK is law, all you'll have done is to smooth the way for it. Your promises, and crypto-anarchic 'tudes won't amount to a stack of cards. Your wimpy sounding safegaurds and reasons why PGP Inc would have to be bought out, all staff sacked etc. don't sound very reassuring. Saying "over my dead body", doesn't really help us if we are realistic enough to figure that you'll be dead, and we'll have GAK. Personally I'd sooner we didn't have GAK (and that y'all lived too). Oh yeah, and the reason we're all "picking on you" is nothing, absolutely nothing what-so-ever, to do with the fact that PGP is an "Inc" now. The reason that it appears to you that we're picking on you is that we're trying to ram a few simple points through your skulls which we consider may be significant points in the political wars potentially leading up to mandatory GAK. For example, major point #1: that by attempting to enforce GAK compliance on the IETF OpenPGP standard you will make it easier, much easier, major point this, listening?, much easier to introduce GAK, because they can then do so interoperably with the OpenPGP standard, which you're hoping will be #1 internet email application used by netscape like 80% market dominance figures. PGP Inc has easily within it's powers the ability to remove this easy migration path for manditory GAK. Point #2, is more of a technical point really: you seem to be mixing key functionality to the detriment of security to provide a fully functional corporate email snooping service. Here's a meme to pass around the office: separate storage and encryption keys are just as important as separate encryption keys and signature keys. This is also fairly important, as keys have different recovery requirements, and different life time requirements. Re-using communication encryption keys for storage keys causes all sorts of problems. One of which is getting shouted at for being GAK compliant. Oh yes, and email in your received folder is NOT a communication anymore, it is now _stored_, and should therefore, if it is encrypted be encrypted with said storage key. Now, if y'all over there are such "live free or die" crypto-anarchist martyr's that you've given up your cisco options, and taken a pay cut, and resisted temptation for a 20% pay rise (and you very well may be die hard crypto-anarchists for all I know, I've only met a few of you), surely argument #1 means something to you: "attempting to enforce GAK compliance on the IETF OpenPGP standard you will make it MUCH easier for USG to introduce GAK" So what's your problem, if skipping on a 20% pay rise isn't a problem, why do you have to implement GAK compliance to provide small amounts of additional functionality for corporate snooping, which isn't even on your stated user requirement list. As I demonstrated you could if you figure this is necessary to the future of free crypto (though I can't see that it is), implement most of the snooping functionality without GAK compliance. It's not as if people can't hack around the whole damn caboodle anyway, as was stated as a plus point in earlier PGP person post. So why GAK compliance for that last couple of % of enforceability on snooping. Think of the lower enforceability as a boon, you've got a technical reason to use to explain to little brother why 100% snooping doesn't work that well without 24 hr video cams surveillance and NSA style body cavity searches at the door. I'd suggest you print the above document out and have a discussion of it. Get PRZ there too. Let us all know the decision so we know whether to start investing in stego applications in preparation for fast-track inadvertently (being generous here, since your whinge) PGP Inc assisted GAK. Cheers, And hang-loose, don't get up-tight, just say no to GAK compliance. Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`